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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this survey, we review the investment operations of pension systems and closely related 
solvency regulations and other investment regulations in selected countries. In addition to 
Finland, we review the Netherlands, Great-Britain, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. In all of 
these countries, the pension provision is financed to a considerable degree by pension assets. 
We also examine the investment allocations of the central actors in the pension systems 
of said countries, as well as the investment returns. In addition, we consider the effects of 
national and international regulatory frameworks on pension investing.
We seek answers to the following key questions in our survey:
• What main rules and principles govern the investment operations in the different 
countries?
• What are the investment risk levels in the different countries?
• What is the ratio of international to domestic investments in the investment allocations 
of the selected actors?
• What kind of return have the selected actors received on their pension investments in 
recent years?
The survey shows that investment operations are increasingly often governed by international 
or, as for some investment instruments, global regulations. As a result of international 
cooperation, global bodies have been established to draft recommendations and goals for, 
in particular, the sustainability of the banking sector, the regulation of derivative financial 
instruments and structural solutions of banking groups. Pension funds, although not part 
of the banking sector, have to take into account or adjust to these regulatory projects and 
be familiar with the regulations of each type of investment. Partly due to the growth in 
pension fund assets, the range of investment instruments has become increasing diversified. 
In addition, the low interest level forces pension funds to use a wider range of investment 
types.
In the past decades, solvency regulations have shifted more towards an assessment of 
risk-based and market-value assets and liabilities, in which the definition of solvency is 
based on the default risks of the actors’ various investment instruments (e.g. Solvency II). As 
the risk-based regulation model has become more common, the Prudent Person Principle has 
become the main principle in the regulation of investment operations. Instead of quantitative 
investment regulations or restrictions, this principle steers investments.
In our survey, we analyse the difference in the risk levels of our selected actors’ 
investment portfolios by roughly separating investments in fixed-income securities from 
other investments. The main thought is that those who operate with a smaller risk have a 
larger share of investments in fixed-income securities in their portfolios while the investment 
portfolios of those who operate with higher risks includes a larger share of other investments. 
Our survey shows that no major changes have taken place in the last decade when it comes 
to the share of investments in fixed-income securities. It has remained substantial: 40–
60 per cent among the selected actors in our survey. In Sweden and Denmark, the share 
has somewhat increased, while the share of investments in fixed-income securities of the 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) and the Finnish private-sector 
pension providers has declined.
Based on the review of the regional allocation of investments, the share of domestic 
investments varies greatly between the selected actors. A characteristic feature of the GPFG 
is that it invests only abroad. As much as 50–60 per cent of the pension investments of the 
Swedish actors are domestic. In Finland, there are considerable differences between the 
actors in terms of the geographical distribution of investments: 20 per cent of the investments 
of public-sector pension providers (Keva and the State Pension Fund) are domestic while the 
equivalent figure for private-sector pension providers is nearly 40 per cent.
A comparison of the returns of the groups of Finnish pension providers and of individual 
large foreign pension providers included in the survey shows that the average pension asset 
returns of Finnish groups of actors are on an average level or below that of the group of 
comparison during the review periods. The average, annual real returns in 2004–2013 varied 
from 3.4 per cent of the Finnish private-sector earnings-related pension providers to 8.0 
per cent of the Danish ATP. The return of Finnish public-sector pension providers was 4.3 
per cent. The actors and groups of actors under review in this survey are among the most 
successful of the pension investors: the average annual real returns are 1.1–5.7 percentage 
points higher than the average return of pension investments in OECD countries.
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1 Introduction1
In this survey, written by the Finnish Centre for Pensions and The Finnish Pension Alliance 
TELA, we review the regulations relating to investments by pension systems in six European 
countries. In addition, we examine the investment returns and the investment allocations, 
as well as the effect on the pension actors of regulations for actors that are external to the 
pension systems. This publication is an abbreviation of the original 2014 publication in 
Finnish in which, among other things, the investment operations and regulations were 
examined separately for each reviewed country.
The survey was initially instigated by the financial crisis that began in 2008 and the 
ensuing increased banking and financial sector regulations, which also affect pension 
investments. In recent years, the pension investment regulations have been developed 
considerably also within national legislation. In addition, the significance of the EU has 
been emphasised in the regulations of the pension sector through the recent reforms of the 
international Solvency and IORP directives that govern pensions. 
Due to the changes in regulations caused by the financial crisis and as the regulatory 
amendments of the EU were outlined, the time was right for a comprehensive look at the 
regulation of pension assets and investment-related factors through an extensive international 
comparison. 
As for the investing and adequacy of pension assets, it is essential what kind of risks 
pension investors are entitled to take. In practice, it is a question about solvency. For 
example, in Finland, the solvency framework of pension insurance companies limits their 
investments. Under law, investments made with Finnish earnings-related pension assets 
must be profitable and prudent. The diversification of investments is governed in more detail 
by regulations on the covering of liabilities and the solvency of earnings-related pension 
providers. The assets of pension institutions must exceed their liabilities to a certain degree, 
i.e. their solvency margin must be large enough. The solvency is used to ensure pension 
providers’ ability to manage the risks relating to their insurance and investment operations. 
The same principles apply to actors from other countries.
The financial crisis of 2008 has increased the need for and the measures taken to further 
secure pensions. As a result of the 2008 financial crises at the latest, supervision has been 
intensified and the managers of pension systems have been obligated to report and to 
undertake stress tests in order to chart their financial status and, hence, be in closer contact 
with their supervisors. Due to the financial crisis, much attention has been paid to solvency 
regulations with which the supervision of the protection of the insured and the policy holders 
is increased. At the same time, supervisors have gained more authority.
1 The authors of the survey would like to thank Ismo Risku, Marjukka Hietaniemi and Mikko Kautto from the Finnish 
Centre for Pensions, Reijo Vanne, Suvi-Anne Siimes and Nikolas Elomaa from the Finnish Pension Alliance TELA, Mikko 
Kuusela from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Pia Santavirta from the Federation of Finnish Financial Services, 
Tarja Kolehmainen and Päivi Malinen from Ilmarinen Mutual Pension Insurance Company on their valuable comments 
at different stages of the work. In addition we would like to thank Lena Koski who translated the publication and Suvi 
Pohjoisaho who prepared the survey for publication.
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1.1 Structure and aims of survey
In this survey, we review how Finland scores when comparing the investment operations of 
pension systems and closely related solvency regulations and other investment regulations 
in selected countries. In our survey, we have also reviewed the investment allocations of the 
central actors in the pension systems of said countries, as well as their investment returns. 
We have selected 1–3 actors from each country. We also consider the effects of both national 
and international regulatory frameworks on pension investing.
The reviewed countries in addition to Finland are the Netherlands, Great Britain, 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark. In all of these, pension assets play a considerable part 
when looking at the sustainability and adequacy of pension provision. In these reviewed 
countries, the (earnings-related) pension systems are far developed, although their structure 
and implementation vary from the statutory and strictly regulated earnings-related pension 
provision of the Nordic countries to the Anglo-American model of voluntary supplementary 
pension arrangements and less strict regulations.
When reviewed in terms of the financing of the earnings-related pension provision, the 
reviewed countries can be divided into two groups: fully funded systems with private actors 
(the Netherlands, Great Britain, Denmark) and pay-as-you-go systems, which make use 
of national buffer funds (Sweden, Norway). The Finnish earnings-related pension system 
includes features from both systems: the pay-as-you-go feature is supplemented (mainly) 
by partial funding managed by private actors. Thus, in structural terms, Finland falls in 
the middle of the reviewed countries. This should be kept in mind when looking at the 
investment regulations under review.
This survey consists of three parts. In the first part, we look at which central principles 
and transnational regulations govern investments. In the second part, we compare the 
investment returns and the differences in investment allocations of the selected actors. 
Finally, in the conclusions, we present our main results and provide answers to the following 
questions:
• What main rules and principles govern the investment operations in the different 
countries?
• What are the investment risk levels in the different countries?
• What is the ratio of international to domestic investments in the investment allocations 
of the selected actors?
• What kind of return have the selected actors received on their pension investments in 
recent years?
In this survey, we do not take a stand on what would be a theoretically optimal investment 
portfolio. Instead, we review the investment portfolios’ risk levels and examine whether the 
so-called equity home bias phenomenon exist in Finland and in the reviewed countries.
In addition to the investment allocations, we also review how the investment returns of 
the selected actors compare with each other.
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2 Central principles and regulations governing investments
Less than twenty years ago, the regulations of the investments of pension funds varied greatly 
in different European countries, and the limits applying to the selection of different investment 
targets deviated considerably from each other. Today, there are many similarities in the 
investment regulations of the reviewed countries. One of the main reasons for this is EU’s 
attempt to unify Member States’ solvency regulations and the steering effect this has on 
actors to which the regulations apply only indirectly.
Traditionally, investments of insurance companies have been regulated by limiting the 
amount that the company can invest in certain investment instruments. As a result of the 
development of transnational regulation, the European supervision and regulation of pension 
assets has largely moved towards a so-called prudent person principle and risk-based 
management. Now investments are regulated mainly from the point of view of the locus 
of risk rather than through detailed limitations. Taking into account its own risk profile, the 
company has to assess what the conservative level of investments and assets is. This practice 
has been in force in Anglo-Saxon countries for a longer period of time (Pylkkönen 1996).
Nowadays, national legislation relating to solvency regulations and investment 
supervision is increasingly developed on a transnational level. The EU exercises great 
influence on regulations concerning, in particular, occupational pensions. There are several 
legislative projects under way concerning such regulations. Recently, there has been much 
talk about the EU Commission’s plans to unify the solvency regulations of the EU Member 
States. The Directive (2009/138/EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) was issued 
on 25 November 2009. The main principles of the recommendation correspond in many 
respects to the Basel II reform of the banking industry, which is based on Directive 2006/48/
EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions. The Solvency 
II Directive was supposed to come into force on 31 October 2012, but it has been postponed 
and will apply as of 1 January 2016.
In addition, amendments to the IORP Directive are being prepared. Their original goal 
was to conform the solvency requirements of so-called II pillar occupational pension funds 
to the principles of Solvency II. The preparations of a common solvency frame have been 
suspended until further notice. The commission’s proposal (COM[2014] 167 final) for a 
reform of the Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision was issued on 
27 March 2014. The directive is scheduled to take effect in 2017. 
 
2.1 Profitability and prudence 
The general principle that governs the investment operations of pension providers is that 
pension assets must be invested profitably and prudently. In Finland this requirement is 
written in the law. Similar requirements for pension providers exist also in other countries. 
For example, according to trust law in the UK, the trustee has a fiduciary duty to act in 
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good faith and in the best interests of the beneficiaries. Likewise, according to legislation, 
the task of the Swedish AP funds is to maximize long-term return, with a low level of 
risk, for the benefit of those insured in the retirement pension system2. Similarly, in the 
Netherlands under investment regulation legislation, pension assets must be invested so that 
the portfolio’s solidity, quality, liquidity and profit are ensured.3
In addition to the renewal of measures developed to secure the pension assets and the 
increasing solidity requirements, the ageing of the population and the financial stagnation 
that has prevailed in Europe for the past few years have increased the demand for pension 
asset investment returns. In addition to extending working lives, the investment returns 
should be sufficient to secure a sustainable pension system. 
Generally speaking, the value of equities and other higher-yielding instruments fluctuates 
quite strongly. Correspondingly, the value of bonds and other investments in fixed-income 
securities fluctuate less but, on the other hand, the return is usually lower than for equities. 
Thus, from the point of view of profitability, the share of equities and other high-yielding 
instruments should be considerable in pension asset investment portfolios. Yet excessive risk-
taking and putting all eggs into one basket should be avoided, both due to the principle of 
prudence and the risk-based solvency regulations.
The solvency regulations are a central part of the regulatory framework, the aim of 
which is to secure the risk management of pension investments. The opportunity to increase 
investment risks is linked individually to each insurance company’s solvency margin. In 
Finland, the solvency regulations have been claimed to limit the efficiency of the investment 
operations of pension insurance companies. Because of the solvency regulations, it has been 
claimed that the investment strategies of earnings-related pension insurance companies are 
too similar to each other and that the companies are not free to make their own investment 
decisions (see, e.g. Johanson et al. 2011). In his evaluation of the Finnish pension system, 
Ambachtsheer (2013) asks whether the solvency regulations are needed at all as 75 per cent 
of the system is pay-go funded. According to Ambachtsheer, the regulations limit long-term 
investing and prevent more profitable investments.
 In our survey, we review how the line is drawn between profitability and prudence 
through, among other things, the relative share of various instruments in the pension actors’ 
investment portfolios in the selected countries. The investment regulations and strategies 
and, at the same time, the other features (e.g. defined benefit, defined contribution) of the 
pension systems are realised in practice through the risk level of the actors’ investment 
portfolios. For the sake of simplicity, it is often natural to think of the division of investment 
assets into equity and interest rate markets. We have attempted to review this aspect by 
comparing the share of other than interest-bearing papers of the total investments in the 
investment portfolios. The larger the share of other instruments, the larger the estimated 
aspiration for profit and hence also risk. 
Related to the issues of profitability and prudence are the discussions of investing the 
pension assets in foreign and domestic targets. In 2005, slightly less than one third of the 
2 Lag (2000:192) om allmänna pensionsfonder (AP-fonder). http://www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/20000192.htm 
3 The FTK-decree of the Pension Act. Besluit financieel toetsingskader pensioenfondsen: http://wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0020871/geldigheidsdatum_30-03-2015 
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investments of pension insurers were in domestic targets. The share has remained roughly 
the same to the current date. According to the Finnish Pension Alliance TELA, a total of 
EUR 49.5 billion were invested in Finland. This accounts for 30 per cent of the investment 
assets. According to theories in mathematical finance, international diversification offers an 
efficient use of financial resources. In addition, the international diversification is a central 
method used in risk management. The public discussion in Finland has called for an equity 
home bias of pension insurers in order to, among other things, improve employment rates. 
Several studies show that the home bias phenomenon is global. Historically speaking, 
the connection between the investments of private-sector pension funds and corporate 
investments in Finland has been close, as the majority of the investments until the early 
1990s were in fact loans for the client companies (premium lending). As a result of the 
liberalized financial markets, this tight connection between premium lending and pension 
providers investments has been dissolved (Hyytinen et al. 2010).
2.2 Prudent person principle instead of quantitative limitations
As the risk-based model has become more common in legislation that governs pension 
systems, the explicit quantitative investment regulations or limitations are decreasing and 
being replaced by qualitative principles and regulations that apply to a pension insurer’s 
modus operandi. The OECD also recommends the model in question in the OECD 
Guidelines on Pension Fund Asset Management 20064. In the Solvency II Directive, instead 
of quantitative regulations, investments are mainly regulated by the so-called Prudent 
Person Principle. According to this principle, the actors may, in general, invest their assets 
as they wish, as long as the operations are governed by certain qualitative principles. These 
principles have been listed in Article 132 of the directive5. 
The prudent person principle pays more attention to the process of investing, i.e. to 
risk mapping and management, than to the actual profitability aims. The actors must set 
their own internal limits for their investment operations. When determining the limits, the 
prudent person principle and a risk-based solvency calculation are in a key position. (See e.g. 
Galer 2002.) The renewed IORP Directive also contributes to the Member States’ reduced 
opportunities to make direct quantitative limitations. According to the new directive, the 
Member States may not limit pension providers from investing in instruments that promote 
growth. Thus, the supervisory organisations of the Member States could only restrict the 
share of equities exceeding 70 per cent of the total assets. 
Despite the increased qualitative nature of investment regulations, quantitative 
limitations continue to be set on pension providers in most industrial countries. According 
to a review by the OECD (2014), the only OECD countries not to pose limitations on the 
types of assets owned by pension providers are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Great-Britain, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and the United States. The limitations are most frequently related 
4 OECD (2006) Guidelines on Pension Fund Asset Management. http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-
pensions/36316399.pdf  
5 DIRECTIVE 2009/138/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up 
and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2009:335:0001:0155:en:PDF 
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to investments in shares and, more strictly, to investments in unlisted shares. There may be 
actor-specific differences in equity investments, such as in Germany where, contrary to other 
actors, supplementary pension funds (Pensionsfonds) may invest all their assets in shares. 
In Finland, the amount of private-sector statutory pension investments in shares are directly 
limited by regulations governing assets held to cover technical provisions: under law, a 
maximum of 15 per cent of pension assets can be invested in unlisted shares. Countries also 
have varying limitations when it comes to other types of asset classes. In addition, foreign 
investments are generally restricted. The regulations are used to limit the amount and share 
of foreign investment asset classes to the overall assets and the geographical allocation of 
the investments. Other limitations include regulations concerning the share of ownership of 
companies invested in.
2.3 Ethical investment principles
The Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) investment principles have gained 
importance in recent years also in pension investments. However, in the reviewed countries, 
these principles are generally not binding but mainly voluntary. In some cases, they are 
binding in terms of the reporting of the investment principles. In Britain, since the year 
2000, the law has obligated pension funds to report not only their general investment 
principles but also possible ethical principles relating to their investment operations. In the 
other reviewed countries, the pension funds are not obligated under law to adhere to or 
report ethical principles, but often the larger actors (e.g. the ABP and the PFZW of the 
Netherlands or Alecta of Sweden) also take ethical principles into account when making 
investment decisions. According to a review covering 12 European countries (including the 
countries of this survey), 56 per cent of the pension funds compared paid at least some 
attention to ethical principles in their investment operations. However, for some complex 
investment instruments, adhering to such principles may be difficult. (Eurosif 2011.)
When it comes to buffer funds, the ethical principles may be more binding. In Norway, 
the ethical regulations of the GPFG prohibit investments in, among others, the arms and 
tobacco industries and in companies which are involved in, for example, human rights 
violations, corruption or environmental crime6,7. In Sweden in 2007, the buffer funds 
(First to Fourth AP funds) established the Ethical Council (Etikrådet) for responsible 
investments. It provides expert guidance in questions relating to, among other things, ethical 
investments and corporate responsibility. The Ethical Council aims to influence corporations 
by emphasizing responsible operations. Likewise, in Finland Keva has a similar body that 
coordinates and develops responsible investing: the Responsible Investment Steering Group. 
Both Keva (in 2008) and the State Pension Fund (in 2011) have signed the UN’s Principles 
for Responsible Investment (UN PRI).
6 Regjeringen.no. Guidelines for the observation and exclusion of companies from the Government Pension Fund 
Global’s investment universe. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/the-economy/the-government-pension-fund/
responsible-investments/guidelines-for-observation-and-exclusion/id594254/ 
7 Strategy Council 2013. Responsible Investment and the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global – Main Report. 
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/67729d894e5745678a4988d86f210aea/sc_mainrreport.pdf 
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2.4 Assessing Solvency
Traditionally, the solvency calculation of life insurance companies in particular has been 
based on averaged asset values or long-term values, and when calculating the liabilities, a 
fixed-rate discount rate and a fixed-rate solvency buffer relating to insurance premiums have 
been used (Severinson & Yermo 2012).
However, in the past decades, the regulation that is applied to life insurance companies 
has shifted more towards an assessment of risk-based and market-value assets and liabilities, 
in which the definition of solvency is based on the default risks of the actors’ various 
investment instruments (e.g. Solvency II). In this way, the solvency buffers required of 
actors that invest in more risk-prone asset types is larger compared to actors with a lower-
risk portfolio. At the same time, the liabilities should be calculated according to the return of 
risk-free instruments, reflecting the character of the liabilities.
In general, the above-mentioned principle has not been applied to traditional pension 
providers (industry-wide pension funds and company pension funds). In the reviewed 
countries, however, the risk-based model is applied fairly comprehensively. For example, 
the OECD (Severinson & Yermo 2012) finds Finland and the Netherlands to be forerunners 
in the monitoring of solvency as, for a longer period of time, also other actors than insurance 
companies have been subject to an assessment model comparable to that of Solvency II.
In Finland, the solvency requirements for industry-wide pension funds and company 
pension funds were reformed between 1996 and 1998 to correspond to the similar regulations 
of earnings-related pension companies. The current solvency regulations for pension 
providers, which bind the supervisory limits to the risk rate of the investment property, came 
into force in 1997. There are no solvency requirements for public-sector actors.
The solvency regulations of Finnish private-sector pension providers have been reformed 
in recent years: in 2008 in connection with the financial crisis and again in 2011 and 2013, 
when the first two phases of a three-phase reform came into effect. The third phase will come 
into effect as of the beginning of 2017. In the first two phases, the solvency regulations were 
changed so that they became more contracyclical, i.e. so that they function better against 
the market conditions. If the market conditions weaken the equity values considerably, 
the authorities can now temporarily ease the solvency regulations or related liabilities so 
that pension providers do not have to materialise their assets when facing bear markets. In 
addition, in the third phase, the calculation method for the solvency regulations of private-
sector pension providers will be renewed so that the procedure that is now largely based on 
a classification of instruments will shift to a system based on the risks of the instruments. 
2.5 Solvency II Directive
The main impacts of the directive focus on a central complex of issues that regulate the 
operations of an insurance company, such as the company’s solvency requirements, the 
administrative system, reporting, information releases and supervision. The significance 
of the reform is extremely large for the European insurance field and for the supervisory 
authorities, since in some European countries, insurance companies or related actors handle 
a larger portion of social insurance than they do in Finland. However, Solvency II will not 
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cover statutory pension insurance and hence not the Finnish statutory earnings-related pension 
system. In many other European countries, the significance of occupational supplementary 
pensions is considerably larger, and the majority of them are managed by life insurance 
companies.
The Solvency II Directive8 aims to standardise the solvency requirements and principles 
of insurance supervision for insurance and reinsurance businesses in the EU Member States, 
to improve the security of policy holders and beneficiaries, and to increase the international 
competitiveness of the European insurance field. 
The solvency requirements of Solvency II are based on the actual financial status and risk 
profile of the insurance institution. All relevant risks are taken into account in the solvency 
regulations (insurance, market, credit, currency, counterparty and operative risks). Solvency 
II regulates, among other things, two capital limits: the Solvency Capital Requirement and 
the Minimum Capital Requirement. The former defines the amount of capital that a non-
life or a life insurance company must have so that it can endure considerable unforeseeable 
losses and thus be reliable from the point of view of the policyholder. The latter defines 
the capital level below which the interests of the policyholder would be considerably 
jeopardised; going below that level launches special supervisory measures.
As for administration and supervision, the central reforms of the Solvency II apply to, 
on the one hand, the requirements of a reliable administration and, on the other hand, the 
supervision of solvency. The regulations concerning the reliable administration of insurance 
companies has been reformed so that increasing emphasis is paid to the liability of the 
insurance company’s management in relation to an anticipatory, efficient and transparent 
administration and risk management of the insurance company. Furthermore, the reporting 
to supervisory authorities and the information release of insurance institutions will be 
standardized and expanded. The supervisory rights of supervisors will be harmonized through 
reforms relating to the supervision of insurance companies. The aim is to increasingly unify 
supervisory practices, in relation to which regulations concerning the supervisory process 
will be issued for the first time. The regulations emphasise risk-based supervision.
In the future, the Solvency II Directive and the Commission’s regulations will be 
supplemented with instructions and recommendations issued by the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).
2.6 The IORP Directive
Occupational pensions and pension funds are regulated on an EU level with the so-called 
IORP Directive (Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision). The 
directive is not applied on the Finnish statutory earnings-related pension system, but it is 
applied to the industry-wide pension funds and company pension funds in Finland insofar 
as they offer occupational pensions. Under Article 2 of the directive, the directive’s scope 
8 DIRECTIVE 2009/138/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up 
and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2009:335:0001:0155:en:PDF
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of application includes institutions that offer occupational pensions. The directive includes 
regulations on, among other things, the separation of financial companies and occupational 
insurance companies from each other, the duties to inform pension recipients and members of 
the institution, authority reporting, the power of competent authorities, technical provisions, 
principles relating to investing, cross-border operations and the administration of property 
and the custody of assets.
The Commission has justified the reform of directive (so called IORP II) by, among 
other things, more efficient regulations and an improved fund management to allow pension 
funds to handle their pension obligations and to be sufficiently administered. In addition, 
the Commission wants to improve economic growth and steer assets into long-term real 
economy investments: pension funds administer considerable assets on an EU level9. 
The Commission’s proposal does not include specific solvency regulations but focuses 
on other sectors. Regarding investments, for example, the Commission wants to prevent 
Member States from excessively limiting, through national legislation, pension funds 
from investing in share-like instruments. It also wishes to facilitate the operations and 
establishment of cross-border pension funds. 
2.7 Pension funds part of larger asset management regulation
In their practical investment operations, pension funds have to take into consideration the 
changes in regulations for the banking and financial sector since banks play a major role in 
the capital market, for example, in securities trading, as financing agents, as market makers 
and as administrators of currency and payment systems. In this connection, ’banks’ refers to 
credit and financial institutions which are subject to supervision and which operate under a 
license.
 In addition to banks, there is an increasing number of so-called shadow banks operating 
in the financial markets. They are financial agents that are external to the banking field10. For 
example, if a real estate deal is financed by a non-life insurance company instead of a bank, 
the non-life insurance company is a shadow bank. Both in the west and in Asia, there is an 
increasing number of actors in the shadow bank sector. There are various assessments of 
the size of this sector11. In general, the actors of the shadow banking sector are regulated by 
other regulations than those that apply to credit institutions. 
In the following, we present a brief review of the banking and financial sector regulations, 
as well as of the regulations of various types of instruments. Regulations in the insurance 
field are similar to those in the banking field. For example ”Basel for insurers” is how the 
European Union’s Solvency II Directive is often described. In other words, Solvency II is 
somewhat similar to the banking regulations of Basel II. 
9 COM(2014) 167 final, 27.3.2014. Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on 
the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
pensions/docs/directive/140327_proposal_en.pdf 
10 Financial Stability Board: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking – An Overview of Policy 
Recommendations, 29 Aug 2013.
11 See e.g. Financial Stability Board, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2013, Nov 2012.
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Pension funds were not the source of the financial crisis, but second to the banking and 
asset management sector, they are among the most influential actors affected by regulation. In 
addition, low interests launched by the financial crisis force pension investors to continually 
seek profit from a wider range of instruments. This means that the related regulations must 
be known in detail and adhered to. The aim of increasing regulations is to add transparency 
to the markets and to improve investor rights. On the other hand, the rising administrative 
costs of the funds as a result of the increasing regulation pose possible threats, as they raise 
the administrative fees that investors have to pay. 
2.7.1 Changes to banks’ capital requirements and the Basel regulatory framework
The main regulatory framework for the banking sector is the Basel regulatory framework, 
drawn up by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The third instalment of the Basel 
regulatory framework, the so-called Basel III12, has already been published. It regulates, 
first and foremost, the solvency of banks: the solvency margin of banks is divided into tiers, 
some of which are long-term assets while others are such that they can be quickly liquidated. 
The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) includes regulations on the amount of securities that a 
credit institution must have that can be realised within 30 days. 
Basel III includes the so-called Capital Requirements Regulation13 and Directive (CRR/
CRD IV)14 for the EU area. The directive and the regulation include the Basel III regulative 
framework, as well as other minimum requirements set for banking operations within the 
EU area. The Commission has also desired to unify the competitive preconditions of the 
banks in the EU area, which is why the capital requirements for all banks (rather than just 
for major banks) have been regulated at the level of the Basel III regulative framework. 
Changes to banking regulations
In addition to the Basel III regulatory framework, the regulatory changes that have been of 
significance to banks have concerned what operations banks can engage in. In the United 
States, the Volcker rule15, which is part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform16 and Consumer 
Protection Act, prohibits US banks from engaging in proprietary trading. The same 
issue has been discussed in Great Britain by the so-called Vickers group17 and in the European 
Commission by the Liikanen group18. Both groups have presented recommendations on, for 
12 Bank for International Settlements. International regulatory framework for banks (Basel III). http://www.bis.org/
bcbs/basel3.htm. 
13 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
14 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to the activity of credit institutions 
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 26 Jun 2013, amending Directive 2002/87/EC 
and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. 
15 See e.g. Department of the Treasury, Prohibitions and Resctrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests In, 
and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds.
16 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111–203, H.R. 4173.
17 Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report – Recommendations, Sep 2011.
18 High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector chaired by Erkki Liikanen, Final Report, 
2 Oct 2012.
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example, how the ratio between banking activities and trading with the bank’s own assets 
should be handled in the future. Based on the work by Liikanen’s group, the EU Commission 
issued a proposal for a regulation on 29 January 201419.
Coherent banking supervision of the Eurozone and recovery resolution
The EU Member States have agreed on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)18. In addition, an EU Single Rulebook20 for deposit 
and commercial banks is under construction. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD) was issued on 15 May 201421. In addition to the directive, the Commission issued 
a proposal for a delegated regulation on 21 October 2014, which would define, among other 
things, how much each individual credit institution would have to pay into its liquidation 
funds each year22. The proposed regulation is very detailed and includes several attachments. 
Furthermore, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has held several hearings for the 
market actors on, for example, proposals and instructions for technical standards23.
2.7.2 MIFID – Investment Services and regulated markets
The most significant regulatory framework for securities in the EU area is probably the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID II24) and the reform of the MIFIR 
regulation25. On a general level, MIFID II/MIFIR focus on the regulation of trade centres, 
investment service companies, centre counterparts and stock exchanges. They also apply 
to the regulation of the implementation of investor protection, sales and offerings of 
investment services and authority supervision. MIFID applies to equities, bonds, derivatives 
and investment funds’ fund of funds.
The reform is very extensive: The project includes new reporting obligations for 
administrators of market places relating to, among other things, the trade volumes of the 
market places and the types of exchanged securities. The aims of the reform include
• to influence the transparency of the price formation on the markets, in particular 
regarding such market places from which information has not been reported to 
authorities or public registers 
19 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on structural measures improving the 
resilience of EU credit institutions, COM(2014) 43 final.
20 http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/single-rulebook.
21 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending.
22 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No…/… of XXX supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing arrangements, 
C(2014) 7674/3.
23 EBA/CP/2014/30 October 2014, EBA/CP/2014/29 October 2014, EBA/CP/2014/28 September 2014, EBA/ 
CP/2014/26 September 2014, EBA/CP/2014/25 September 2014, EBA/CP/2014/24 September 2014, EBA/CP/2014/23 
September 2014, EBA/CP/2014/22 September 2014, EBA/CP/2014/21 September 2014, EBA/CP/2014/09 September 
2014, EBA/CP/2014/18 July 2014, EBA/CP/2014/16 July 2014, EBA/CP/2014/15 July 2014, EBA/GL/2014/06 July 
2014, EBA/RTS/2014/12 July 2014 and EBA/RTS/2014/11 July 2014.
24 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, Jun 2014. 
25 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, Jun 2014.
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• to unify and fortify the powers of supervisory authorities in the EU area and to 
harmonise supervisory sanctions 
• to increase competition and the prerequisites for competition 
• to strengthen investment protection 
• to harmonise the regulations that apply to third countries, i.e. countries outside the 
EU.
MIFID II will be implemented as a directive into the legislation of the EU Member States. 
As a regulation, MIFIR is directly binding to the Member States and the actors. Furthermore, 
the Commission will issue an implementation regulation for both MIFID II and MIFIR. In 
addition, regulations from all three EU market supervisory authorities (European Banking 
Authority/EBA, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority/ESMA and 
Markets Authority) are to be expected since the scope of application of MIFID II/MIFIR is 
so extensive. As for derivatives, the MIFID package regulates the procedures of the trade in 
derivatives in the same way as does the EMIR regulation (see below for more details). 
The Commission has estimated that the implementation of the MIFID package will result 
in a lump-sum cost of EUR 512–732 million for actors in the financial and investment sector, 
as well as running annual expenses of EUR 312–58626. The costs are considerable, and small 
actors will probably face increasing difficulties with meeting all regulatory requirements. 
Mid- and long-term, instead of increasing competition, the regulation may drive smaller 
actors to merge with larger ones and reduce the range of actors.
2.7.3 Reporting short selling
In 2012, a regulation on short selling was issued by the EU27. The regulation has been 
supplemented with a technical implementation regulation28, which applies to, among other 
things, technical standards and notification procedures relating to short selling. Thanks 
to the regulation, all EU Member States have uniform regulations on the short selling of 
securities and government bonds and on the notification of short positions. Underlying 
the regulation were, among other things, problems observed during the financial crisis that 
related to speculative short sellings, which were allocated to the troubled stocks of insurance 
and banking groups.
After the financial crisis, during the so-called euro crisis, the same speculative short 
selling was observed with credit default swaps of government bonds, which protect the 
creditor against a state’s insolvency29. The aim of the regulation is to increase stability on 
the capital markets and to prevent the birth of system risks. The regulation was enacted 
26 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II): Frequently Asked Questions, European Commission MEMO/ 
14/305, Apr 2014 2014.
27 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and 
certain aspects of credit default swaps.
28 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 918/2012 of 5 July 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps with regard 
to definitions, the calculation of net short positions, covered sovereign credit default swaps, notification thresholds, 
liquidity thresholds for suspending restrictions, significant falls in the value of financial instruments and adverse event.
29 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/short_selling/index_en.htm
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also because many Member States in the EU area had to pose national bans on short selling 
without a centralised coordination on the quality, duration or impact of the measures.
The regulation obligates the national supervisor of each EU Member State to publish 
on its website the short selling positions whose values exceed 0.5 per cent of the target 
company’s issued share capital. The market actors must report these positions to the 
authorities who administer the said public register on their websites. In addition, the actors 
must notify the competent authority without a public duty to notify of all such positions that 
exceed 0.2 per cent of the combined share capital.
As for the credit default swaps of government bonds, the limiting value is determined 
by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). ESMA keeps a continuously 
updated register on its website. Its figures are based on the total amount of the home state’s 
national debt notified by the national authorities30. The special limiting values are 0.1 and 
0.5 per cent of the amount of the issued national debt. There is no public obligation to 
notify when it comes to government credit default swaps. All positions are calculated in net 
amounts, regardless of whether they are corporate securities or government bonds.
The regulation also prohibits short selling completely when the drawer of the position 
has not borrowed shares or made equivalent arrangements for the securities in question (so-
called naked short selling). This applies to both government bonds and listed shares. 
2.7.4 Regulative amendments to unlisted shares (i.e. private equity and 
  hedge funds) 
The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD)31, was issued by the 
Commission and implemented in the 2014 legislation of EU’s Member States. The 
directive regulates the management and marketing of alternative investment funds offered 
to professional investors. The regulation is directed at managers of previously unregulated 
alternative unlisted investment funds, such as real estate, private equity and hedge funds. 
A regulative framework of their own was desired for these funds after the financial crisis, 
as major system risks were seen in hedge funds in particular. The directive has been 
supplemented with the Commission’s regulations relating to, among other things, the 
handling of debts, depositories and general management principles32, as well as technical 
standards relating to the classification of funds33, and with two implementation regulations34. 
In addition, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has issued instructions 
on how to apply the directive35.
30 http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/Net-short-position-notification-thresholds-sovereign-issuers 
31 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, 8 Jun 2011.
32 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 of 19 Dec 2012 supplementing Directive 2011/61/E.
33 Commission Delegated Regulation 17 Dec 2013 supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU.
34 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 448/2013 of 15 May 2013 ja Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) No 447/2013 of 15 May 2013.
35 See e.g. Guidelines on sound renumeration policies under the AIFMD, ESMA/2013/232, 3 Jul 2013 sekä Questions 
and Answers – Application of the AIFMD, ESMA/2014/868, 21 Jul 2014 ja Guidelines on key concepts of the AIFMD, 
ESMA/2013/611, 13 Aug 2013.
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The AIFMD obligates the fund managers to, among other things, report in detail the 
allocations and instruments of the assets they manage. In addition, the operations have to 
be arranged sufficiently carefully and the risk management must meet the requirements 
of the directive. The perhaps most significant obligations from the point of view of the 
markets concern the use and reporting of debts, i.e. of leverages. From the point of view of 
private equity, another important obligation concerns limitations relating to the editing of 
the private equity of target companies. Relating to the scope of application of the AIFMD, it 
is important to observe that the funds regulated under the so-called UCITS directive or the 
UCITS regime are outside the AIFMD’s scope of application36.
Relative to the AIFMD, the Commission has issued other regulative amendments 
that apply to instruments that are in the form of funds. The regulations issued by the EU 
Commission on the funding of start-up funds or risk venture capital funds (European Venture 
Capital Fund Regulation, EUVeca37), as well as on social entrepreneurship funds (European 
Social Entrepreneurship Fund Regulation, EUSef 38) came into effect on 22 July 2013. In 
addition to the development of economic growth, the regulations were made to create a 
lighter regulatory regime alongside the AIFMD for small funds which are smaller in size 
than the limits set by the AIFMD.
The EUVeca fund must invest at least 70 per cent of its assets into start-ups. The EUSeF 
fund is used to steer more assets into socially non-profit investments. At least 70 per cent of 
the fund’s assets must be invested into social corporations or investments. 
The Commission has processed an increase of long-term funding within the EU area 
in several motions (e.g. a communiqué on the increase of long-term funding39). Concrete 
regulative motions to improve funding and economic growth within the EU area have also 
been made. One concrete motion was the regulative motion published on 26 June 2013 for 
a special type of fund for long-term investments (European Long Term Investment Fund, 
ELTIF)40. ELTIF was to be a realisation platform for, in particular, different real estate, infra, 
PPP and similar projects. As a rule, according to the regulative motion, the ELTIF fund was 
to invest in unlisted shares. However, the investment targets have been defined more broadly 
and permissively than in the funds under the EUVeca or EuSeF regulations. The manager 
of an ELTIF fund has to be an accepted fund manager under the AIFMD. Thus, the ELTIF 
belongs to the AIFMD’s regulatory regime or family. 
2.7.5 Changes in regulations for derivatives
The regulation of the trade in derivatives rose into focus after the financial crisis when 
several international commercial banks and insurance companies went bankrupt, partly due 
36 Directive 85/611/EEC, 20 Dec 1985, on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating 
to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS); and later versions of the Directive.
37 Regulation No 345/2013 on European Venture Capital Funds (EuVECA).
38 Regulation No 346/2013 on European Social Entrepreneurship Funds (EuSEF).
39 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Long-Term Financing of the 
European Economy, Mar 2014, COM(2014) 168 final.
40 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Long-Term Investment Funds, 
COM (2013) 462 final, Jun 2013.
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to the realisation of risks relating to the counterparty and surety position in the trade of 
derivatives, and partly because of a lack of sufficient risk buffers.
In 2009, the G20 countries drew a principle definition of policy, according to which the 
positions of mutual, i.e. OTC derivative financial instruments must be brought into the scope 
of authority supervision. An OTC derivative financial instrument is a mutual agreement 
between two market participants that is not centrally cleared; thus, until now, the central 
information of these instruments has not been known to authority supervisors. In both the 
U.S. and the EU, regulatory projects were launched because of this: in the U.S., the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act41 and in the EU, the European 
Infrastructure Market Regulation (EMIR)42. 
EMIR (648/2012) has been supplemented by implementation regulations and technical 
standards43. In addition, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has 
conducted hearings and compiled technical standards on, among other things, reportable 
data on trade in derivatives and key demands of the central clearing parties (CCP) relating 
to, for example, the arrangement of operations and instructions relating to countries outside 
the EU44.
Since derivatives are accentuatedly international instruments, international groups have 
been established to monitor the regulations. A central group is the Over-the-Counter (OTC) 
Derivatives Regulators Group (ODRG), which is a joint organ relating to regulations on 
derivatives for the authorities in Australia, Brazil, the EU, Hong Kong, Ontario, Quebec, 
Singapore, Switzerland and the U.S. The goals of the forum include to act as a centre of 
cooperation, to develop and implement standards for the trade in derivatives and clearing, to 
efficiently and centrally solve joint problems, as well as to coordinate the information flow 
between central clearing parties, trade centre registers and authorities45. 
The reports of the ODRG point out the need for authorities to receive sufficient 
information of the counterparties of derivative financial instruments46. The ODRG further 
aims at unifying practices and regulative demands. The International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is another organ that works with regulations for derivative 
41 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub.L. 111–203, H.R. 4173).
42 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories.
43 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 148/2013 of Dec 2012, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 
149/2013 of Dec 2012, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 150/2013 of Dec 2012, Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 151/2013 of Dec 2012, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 152/2013 of Dec 2012, Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 of Dec 2012, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 1247/2012 of Dec 
2012, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 1248/2012 of Dec 2012, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
1249/2012 of Dec 2012, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1002/2013 of July 2013, Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 1003/2013 of July 2013, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 876/2013 of May 2013, 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 285/2014 of February 2014 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 
667/2014 of March 2014. 
44 ESMA/2013/302 April 2013, ESMA/2013/322 June 2013, ESMA/2013/661 June 2013, ESMA/2013/
BS/1159 September 2013, ESMA/2013/1375 October 2013, ESMA/2013/BS/1158 September 2013, ESMA/2013/ 
BS/1160 September 2013, ESMA/2013/1087 August 2013, ESMA/2013/1657 November 2013 and ESMA/2014/299 
March 2014.
45 http://www.otcdrf.org/.
46 Report of the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group on Cross-Border Implementation Issues, Sep 2014, ODRG.
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financial instruments. IOSCO is an umbrella organisation for the supervisors of securities 
markets and aims at coordinating the global execution of regulations for securities markets47.
Of the derivative financial instruments, an estimated 95 per cent are OTC derivatives, 
while the rest are trade in listed derivative instruments48. Through regulations, OTC 
derivatives are brought under the same clearing obligations and practices as listed derivative 
instruments, which are traded in regulated market places (e.g. stock exchanges). The most 
common derivative financial instrument are probably interest rate swaps (IDS). Other 
common derivatives include credit default swaps (CDS), currency derivatives, commodity 
or raw-material derivatives, options and futures.
Nearly all derivatives can be used either for risk-taking or to reduce one’s own investment 
risk, i.e. for risk management. However, the risk protection is not watertight because, if the 
other contractual party were to become insolvent or otherwise unable to meet the contractual 
obligations, the investor would not receive a return for the investment. Hence, an investor 
who invests largely in derivatives does wisely to closely monitor the counterparties liquidity, 
solvency and financial standing. 
2.7.6 Regulative changes to investments in fixed-income securities
Money market funds
Money market funds are important to all investors in the management of liquid cash assets. 
Money market funds can be described as ”parking lots” for cash assets, in which the return 
is very low but in which, as a rule, the money retains its day’s rate. In the EU area, money 
market funds are estimated to manage assets (in euros alone) worth approximately one 
trillion euros49.
Money market funds can be used, for example, when an investor plans to make changes 
in allocations, the market conditions of which have not been realised as yet but which the 
investor believes to be realise in the near future. Since money market funds are in general 
very liquid, even large assets can be quickly converted into cash.
Pension funds, sovereign wealth funds (SWF) and the majority of insurance companies 
are not covered by the central bank system, which is why money market funds are of great 
importance to these actors. Some of the money market funds have operated with a constant 
net asset value (CNAV), which means that, regardless of the economic situation, the value of 
a fund unit has always been viewed as one euro or one dollar. Some funds have operated with 
a variable net asset value (VNAV), in which case the value of the fund unit depends on the 
market-specific changes in the fund’s assets.
The money market funds caused a systemic risk during the financial crisis in connection 
with redemption flights; some money market funds risked going insolvent because the funds 
did not actually have enough liquid assets to pay the investors. Many money market funds 
47 www.iosco.org.
48 Regulation on Over-the-Counter Derivatives and Market Infrastructures, Memo/12/232, European Commission, 29 
Mar 2012.
49 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/money-market-funds/index_en.htm. 
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have operated with CNAV; in other words, that the value of one share is constantly one 
euro or one dollar, regardless of the worth of the assets managed by the money market 
fund. When the market values of securities have weakened, the money market funds have no 
longer been able to maintain CNAV.
Threats of crisis followed by the redemption flight led to at least the following: the 
derivative losses of the Community Bankers Money in 1994, the bankruptcy of the 
investment banks Reserve Primary and Lehman Brothers in 2008, and the insolvency 
procedures of several South-African money market funds and the African Bank Investments 
Ltd. in 201450.
The EU Commission has issued a proposal for a regulation on Money Market Funds 
(the MMF regulation)51. Also in the U.S.A., regulations on money market funds have been 
issued52. In addition to the MMF regulation, the European Commission has arranged a 
hearing of all market actors53. The regulations in both the U.S.A. and the EU follow the 
recommendations of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB). The American regulation forces, among other things, certain money market 
funds that serve institutional clients to use VNAVs or floating net asset values (FNAV).
 In addition, the board of a fund can implement either liquidity or redemption fees if 
the assets that fall due within one week drop to less than 30 per cent of the fund’s assets. In 
addition to the fees, the board of a fund can set redemption gates which would completely 
prevent the redemption of shares. However, the gates should not be valid for more than 
10 days. Limitations through gates are currently employed based on contractual usage, in 
particular in hedge funds.
The MMF regulation of the Commission allows money market funds to invest the fund 
assets in money market instruments only, in repurchase agreements (so-called repo trading), 
in credit institution deposits and financial derivatives. The regulation requires that the money 
market funds have certain liquidity levels on a daily and weekly basis. 
The funds also have to define a weighted average maturity (WAM) of the fund’s assets. 
Money market funds using CNAV should have a capital conservation buffer of at least three 
per cent. In addition, funds should have procedures for client profiling, as well as internal 
credit rating and credit rating investigation methods in order to avoid that funds are not 
solely dependent on external credit rating agencies54.
50 Financial Times, Aug 24 2014 and http://www.futuregrowth.co.za/news/breaking-the-buck-abil-proves-the-money-
market-guarantee-is-a-fallacy 
51 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Money Market Funds, COM(2013) 615 
final, Sep 2013.
52 Securities and Echange Commission, Jul 2014: 17 CFR Parts 230, 239, 270, 274 and 279, Release No. 33-9616, IA-
3879; IC-31166; FR-84; File No. S7-03-13, RIN 3235-AK61, Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF.
53 Consultation Document, Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Product Rules, 
Liquidity Management, Depositary, Money Market Funds, Long-term Investments, DG INT MARKT, Jul 2012.
54 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Money Market Funds, COM(2013) 615 
final, Sep 2013.
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Government bonds 
Government bonds are the most common type of bonds on the capital market. They can 
be used, among other things, as ’fuel’ in the refinancing markets of credit institutions as 
securities in so-called repurchase agreement trading. Government debentures can also be 
used as collateral in derivative contracts. 
The bonds of the largest issuers have considerably liquid secondary markets (e.g. the 
U.S.A and Germany). As the interest rate level is very low at the moment, an increasing 
number of investors have transferred their investments from bonds of developing countries 
to the riskier bonds of developing countries. Along with this, the debt service costs of 
developing countries have decreased, but it is difficult to say whether the coupon rates of the 
bonds of all developing countries correspond to the risk levels of these bonds.
The actual government bond instrument is subject to a change in provisions developed 
and agreed by the EU Commission’s economic and financial committee on 18.11.2011. In 
these provisions, the content of the so-called collective action clause (CAC) was specified 
in relation to all government bonds to be issued in the Eurozone55. The new model of 
provisions was included in all government bonds of the Eurozone as of 1.1.201356. Bonds 
issued prior to this time are not subject to the provision, excluding the restructured bonds of 
the loan arrangement of the Greek government. These restructured bonds are subject to the 
legislation of Great Britain rather than that of Greece.
Underlying the new CAC provision are the Greek debt crisis and the decision of the 
ministries of finance of the EU Member States made on 28.10.2010 to amend the provisions. 
The idea took form based on the Greek debt arrangement when trying to avoid a situation 
in the future in which a small minority of creditors could too efficiently resist the 
rearrangements of debts. The main idea is that changes to debts can be accepted with a lower 
acceptance rate than earlier, or in other words, that a qualified majority of 66 per cent rather 
than the previous 75 per cent could be enough to be binding in relation to all debtors.
A change in the CAC provision brings the bonds of the Eurozone closer to the market 
practices of Great Britain and the United States57.
In addition to the Commission, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) 
issued new model provisions on 29.8.2014 concerning the CAC provision of government 
bonds as well the provision containing the pari passu principle. In general, the pari passu 
principle means a principle of uniform treatment58. The new model proposals aim at 
clarifying and simplifying the insolvency procedures and reducing the risk of a small 
minority of debtors completely standing in the way of arrangements that the majority 
of debtors supports. For example, the prolonging of the process of the most recent Greek 
debt arrangement caused turbulences in the capital markets which, in turn, contributed to the 
55 Economic and Financial Committee, Common Terms of Reference, Feb 2012 and Supplemental Provisions, Feb 2012.
56 EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets – Model Collective Action Clause – Supplemental Explanatory 
Note, Mar 2012.
57 Report on the implementation of euro area model Collective Action Clauses (CACs), EFC Sub-Committee on EU 
Sovereign Debt Markets.
58 International Capital Market Association, Standard Aggregated Collective Action Clauses (”CACs”) for the Terms 
and Conditions of Sovereign Notes, 29 Aug 2014 sekä Standard Pari Passu Provision for the Terms and Conditions of 
Sovereign Notes, 29 Aug 2014.
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prolonging of the process. The first state to include the new model provisions of the ICMA 
in the new bonds issued was the state of Kazakhstan59.
Development of corporate sector credit instruments
In several European countries, new credit instruments have been developed to revive financing 
and to make the financial sources more versatile. The financing of the SME sector has been 
addressed in, among other places, the Green Paper published in 2013 by the European 
Commission on long-term financing60. In addition, the OECD project includes the same 
questions approached from slightly different angles61. The Commission has proposed, for 
example, that bonds of the SME sector be included in the Member States’ national 
regulation. SMEs should have their own, lighter form of regulated bonds, which they could 
issue either at their own market place or, for instance, on the Nasdaq OMX First North list62.
Another idea favoured by the Commission is a separate credit rating service for SMEs, 
which might increase the interest of major investors in SME financing. The Green Paper 
on long-term financing published by the European Commission presents a uniform credit 
rating or a so-called rating system that covers all of the Eurozone. With the help of the rating 
system, banks and investors could form a clear picture of the financial status of the SME and 
compare the target with similar corporations.
Currently, credit institutions use internal, very sophisticated credit rating processes, but 
there is no generally uniform system on an EU level. However, such a system has been 
planned already in several EU Member States. 
2.7.7 Commission’s and OECD’s bill to support long-term investing 
In the Commission’s Green Paper, ways in which to increase long-terms financing and 
investing in the EU area are charted63. The Green Paper addresses comprehensively the 
different sections of financing and presents the following initiatives:
• creating a special EU-wide savings account for consumers that focuses on long-term 
investments 
• lowering the capital demands/stress levels of certain investment instruments of the 
Solvency II Directive
• assessing the solvency requirements for banks in relation to long-term lending
• (CRDIV and CRR)
• coordinating public development banks and guarantee institutions (e.g. export 
subsidies and the European Investment Bank)
59 See  e.g.  http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/3388638/Kazakh-CAC-adoption-heralds-new-era-for-
sovereigndebt-restructuring.html
60 Green Paper – Long-Term Financing of the European Economy, Mar 2013, COM(2013) 150 final.
61 Institutional Investors and Long-term Investment, OECD, 2013.
62 http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com.
63 Green Paper – Long-Term Financing of the European Economy, Mar 2013, COM(2013) 150 final.
26 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, SURVEYS
• assessing the regulations governing securitisation, in particular in terms of 
stabilisation, real estate and infrastructure targets, and
• creating a credit rating system for SMEs64.
Similar to the Commission, the OECD has charted the possibilities to increase long-term 
instruments. The OECD has launched the project ”Institutional Investors and Long-term 
Investment”, which charts new possible investment instruments to support and increase long-
term investment among institutional investors.
As part of this project, the G20 countries and the OECD have formulated central 
principles for supporting long-term investment. In these principles, emphasis is put on, 
among other things, the creation of the correct circumstances for long-term investment 
markets, the utilising of long-term savings in investments, the readiness of institutional 
investors to make long-term investments and the construction of a suitable taxation frame 
for long-term investments. The OECD has also produced ample comparative material of 
various countries’ propositions, with which long-term investments have been supported. 
So far, institutional investors have allocated less than 1 per cent of their total allocation 
to investments in infrastructure65. According to the OECD, institutional investors managed 
assets worth approximately USD 65 trillion at year-end 2009. Institutional investors refer to 
both pension funds and separate sovereign wealth funds (SWF). 
The capital managed by long-term investors can be seen as patient capital or as socially 
engaging capital when invested in, for example, social infrastructure projects. Therefore, the 
OECD encourages governments to develop the administrative regulations for institutional 
investors to ensure a sufficient knowhow of long-term investments. In addition, governments 
should be encouraged to reduce short-term risk-taking.
According to the OECD and the EU Commission, investments in infrastructure are model 
examples of long-term investments. Such investments increased in the 1980s and the 1990s 
due to the privatisation of government-owned energy, traffic and data networks66. In general, 
investments into these have been made through unlisted rather than listed companies67. Listed 
companies are more commonly used in real estate investment (in particular, through so-
called real estate investment trusts [REITs]).
2.8 Possible regulatory effects on pension fund investments
2.8.1 Solvency II and IORP Directives
The Solvency II Directive is not applied to Finnish statutory earnings-related pension 
insurance. Similarly, the IORP Directive is applied to Finnish earnings-related pension 
64 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Long-Term Financing of the 
European Economy, Mar 2014, COM(2014) 168 final.
65 Institutional Investors and Long-Term Investment – Project Report, May 2014, OECD.
66 The Role of Banks, Equity Markets and Institutional Investors in Long-Term Financing for Growth and Development, 
Report for G20 Leaders, OECD, Feb 2013.
67 Pooling of Institutional Investor Capital – Selected Case Studies in Unlisted Equity Infrastructure, Apr 2014, G20/
OECD Task Force.
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insurers only to a limited degree (the supplementary pension component of both industry-
wide and company pension funds). Therefore, the direct effects are minor. The indirect 
effects may arise through investment markets if the share of instruments change in the 
insurers’ allocations. The solvency regulations of Solvency II have increased the relative 
weight of the allocation of loan-type investments in the investment operations of life and 
non-life insurance companies in the EU area. If the solvency regulations of IORP would 
be adapted in the future on the same basis, the share of loan-type investments in relation to 
investments in equities could increase in the supplementary pension funds in the EU area. 
Nevertheless, it is still too early to make any precise predictions on this issue. 
2.8.2 Changes to regulations on banking
The precise effects of banking regulations for pension investors are difficult to assess, but 
the effects may be visible in, among other things, the liquidity of securities. When banks 
are likely to reduce the so-called market making operations in the future, the exchange of 
securities may not remain as vivid as it is today. Part of the market making operations may 
be transferred to other actors, such as those operating in the shadow banking sector, but it 
is impossible to say to what degree this would happen. In addition, due to the transitional 
provisions, the transitional amendments have not yet come into full effect. Traditional 
loaning may also be transferred to the shadow banking sector. In the future, actors within 
the insurance sector may participate in lending since lending may sometimes be a type of 
investment; the same object can be invested in either by buying shares or by granting a loan 
to the target actor.
The modus operandi and products of the capital markets may be renewed, which may 
weaken the negative effects or introduce new instruments for investors. New banking 
investment instruments, so-called contingent capital instruments68, have already been 
introduced on the markets. Typically, if the bank’s solvency level falls below a certain limit, 
the loan is automatically converted into equities, which will strengthen the bank’s capital 
structure. Coco bonds have also been issued on the markets, the allocations of which are 
annulled in a similar situation. The optimal risk-profit pricing of new instruments is a short-
term challenge for investors.
2.8.3 MIFID – regulating financial markets
Although MIFID II mainly affects the providers of investment services, the investors will 
also be affected by the directive. Making an exact assessment of the effects is difficult 
because of the lack of detailed regulations. As for service providers, the MIFID II sets 
partly unnecessarily detailed requirements, and we might ask whether there is a risk of 
overregulation in the EU area? Overregulation might hinder new actors from entering the 
field and prevent competition between service producers. In addition, actors may transfer to 
areas with lighter regulation.
68 CoCos: A primer, Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review 2013, Sep 2013.
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Long term, this type of development – a centralisation of fields and a possible reduction 
in competition – is not favourable to investors. It is also to be expected that, in particular 
for large investors, the reporting obligations will become increasingly comprehensive; the 
MIFID II package includes some similar operational obligations also for investors. 
2.8.4 Regulation on short selling
In the Commission’s own consequence assessment it has been estimated that the regulation 
on short selling has increased the transparency of the markets and improved the flow of 
the liquidation procedures69. The report finds no harmful effects of the provisions of the 
regulation. Since the regulation has been in force for only two years when the report was 
compiled, the Commission finds that the effects of the regulation should be monitored for at 
least another three years before changes to the regulation are considered.
2.8.5 Amendments to regulations for private equity and hedge funds 
The AIFMD affects the operations of fund management companies more than that of 
investors. In the future, companies have to report extensively of the operations and 
management of the funds to the authorities. In addition, the authorities have the mandate 
to intervene regarding the use of leverage in the fund. This is a major change in the private 
equity and hedge fund markets, because previously, these actors have been completely 
external to this type of authority mandates. 
The consequences of the AIFMD for institutional investors are perhaps most directly 
evident in the regulations concerning marketing and third countries, i.e. countries external 
to the EU area. A fund management company that is external to the EU area has to either 
apply for a permission from the authorities of some Member States to market its funds or 
register itself as a licensed actor in the EU area through, for example, a branch office. One 
of the requirements to receiving a marketing permission is that the state in which the fund 
is located in and the EU Member states have an agreement concerning the exchange of 
taxation information. 
Another issue from the investors’ point of view is that that funds’ fees will rise due to the 
increasing regulation. After the financial crisis, the management fees on the markets have 
become slightly more moderate as fund-raising and the establishment of funds has become 
more difficult. Since the regulations provide several preconditions to arrange the operations 
and make it obligatory to use a custodian, it is possible that the operating costs will grow and 
hence also the management fees paid by investors.
The EuSEF, EuVECA and ELTIF projects will probably not have a direct impact 
on the investment operations of the pension funds. For fund management companies, 
however, they will offer new instruments for the selection of the funds’ form of operation. 
Pension investors may therefore come across these types of funds in the marketing of fund 
management companies. However, the prerequisites set for new types of funds are partly 
69 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the Regulation (EU) No 
236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, COM(2013) 885 final, Dec 2013.
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complex and may excessively limit the operations of fund management companies and thus 
reduce their popularity.
2.8.6 Changes in regulations for derivatives
Since a derivative contract can be made by telephone or e-mail with practically any trading 
centre and a counterparty located anywhere in the world, the relocation of the market 
operator is one of the greatest risks. National companies are generally listed in their ’home’ 
stock exchange, and changing the place of listing and moving the headquarters is a massive 
operation. Shifting a trading platform is much easier. For this reason, the regulation may 
make it easier to open up new trading centres in, for example, Singapore or Hong Kong 
rather than in the EU area or the United States. This effect is mitigated, however, by the fact 
that the majority of the world’s investment assets and major banks are located in Europe 
and the U.S. Nevertheless, when looking at the growth of the savings and pension funds of 
developing households, the situation may change significantly already in the 2020s.
In the future, pension investors may deal more frequently with actors from areas with 
different regulations. The regulatory arbitrage of such actors may, however, be restrained 
by global cooperation in order to unify regulation. It is likely, though, that there will be a 
division midterm, before regulation is made globally whole and unified.
2.8.7 Regulative changes to investments in fixed-income securities 
Government bonds have become an important fixed-income security in investors’ allocations. 
However, pension investors have not usually been major investors in the most risk-prone 
government bonds such as those which have led to the above-mentioned bankruptcy 
proceedings. Regulatory reforms concerning problematic situations may, however, bring 
about legal security and predictability to the government bond markets which, in the long 
run, will be advantageous also to investors.
The low interest level has made fixed-income instruments less attractive. High-risk 
and high-profit business loans have become increasingly popular fixed-income instruments. 
Therefore it is probably a good thing that the regulation concerning instrument types is 
reformed in order to increase transparency and liquidity. If protracted, the low interest level 
will make it more difficult to analyse the optimal risk-return ratio, particularly regarding 
fixed-income instruments.
2.8.8 Regulative bills for long-term investment
As a rule, many of the long-term investments in infrastructure are well suited for pension 
investors. However, as an investment class, investments in infrastructure and real estate 
are a heterogeneous group and individual investments must always be carefully analysed. 
In addition, inflation protection is an important element as the return on investments in 
infrastructure and real estate tend to be moderate. Finnish pension investors have traditionally 
invested in foreign real estate and infrastructure indirectly through funds, but in the future, 
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we are likely to witness an increasing amount of direct investments, particularly in other 
Nordic countries.
Investments into infrastructure, real estate and land are also tied to legislation. For 
example, if a country does not implement road tolls, it is impossible to make an investment 
into such an infrastructure in that country. The legislation concerning the ownership of real 
estate and land is also often based on history and tradition and varies more between countries 
than, for example, IT or media legislation. However, if international operators, such as the 
OECD and the EU Commission, compile functional regulation models for international 
investments in infrastructure and real estate, we can assume that these instruments will grow 
in popularity of pension investors’ allocations.
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3 Comparison of risk and return of investment operations in   
 selected countries
Pension asset investments are charted using the return per operator and operator groups and 
the rough allocations by investment type and region. We have selected to examine central 
pension investors located in the reviewed countries (Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden). When selecting the operators, we aimed at finding the 
pension investors who managed a considerable amount of pension assets. We used the top 
1,000 European Pension Fund list of Investment Pensions Europe (IPE)70, through which 
European pension investors are ranked based on the size of the managed assets. In addition to 
the large amount of assets, the choice of actors was affected by the availability of comparable 
data71. The comparison is done for the available data in intervals of 5 and 10 years. 
3.1 General data on earnings-related pension systems and example actors of  
 the reviewed countries
The reviewed countries are alike in that earnings-related pension systems are common in 
these countries and the systems are very comprehensive. Through collective agreements, 
quasi-mandatory earnings-related pension systems can be found in the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Denmark. In Norway, occupational pensions were made mandatory in 2006. In Britain, 
they are voluntary, but due to, among other things, the relatively low level of the statutory 
pension system, they are reasonably common, covering approximately half of the wage 
earners.
The Finnish earnings-related pension is part of the statutory social security, but some 
features in our earnings-related pension system are similar to those of occupational pensions. 
The most essential of these features are the following:
• no pension ceiling
• the central role of the labour market organisations 
• the system is decentralised and, for the most part, managed under civil law
• competition between the various actors, and
• partly funded system.
70 Investment&Pensions Europe, September 2014: S&P Capital IQ’s MMD TOP 1000 Pension Funds 2014. 
71 The data has been presented mainly for the same period and with the same content. Data deviating from the main 
rule has been used for the following:
Finnish public-sector pension insurers: No allocation data available for the year 1999. The allocation data for the past 15 
years is thus for the past 14 years, from 2000 to 2013.
USS: The allocation data is always per the end of March of the following year. For example, the allocation data for 2013 is 
per 31 march 2014. The regional distribution of the allocations is based on the data of listed securities.
BT: All data for 2013 is per the end of June 2013. The data for the other years is per the end of each year. The regional 
distribution of the allocations is based on the data of listed securities. 
Industriens Pension: The regional distribution of the investments are based on the data on all investments in the period 
from 2006 to 2010 and the data of equities in the period from 2011 to 2013.
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Compared to the other countries under review, the Finnish earnings-related pension can be 
equalled to both statutory and occupational pension provision and meets the purpose of both. 
In an international comparison, this is evident in the relatively low number of occupational 
pensions in Finland.
In the countries under review, the occupational pensions are generally fully funded. The 
relatively high funding rate in relation to the economy also speaks of their significance for 
each country’s overall pension system. Of the countries under review, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands and Denmark have accumulated large pension funds with assets that exceed the 
countries’ GDP. In Sweden, the occupational pension assets amounted to approximately 60 
per cent and in Norway to 50 per cent of GDP.
Of the reviewed countries, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark (ATP) fund statutory 
pensions in advance. In Finland, the assets of the statutory earnings-related pension amount 
to 80 per cent of GDP. In Sweden, the equivalent figure is 30 per cent, in Norway and 
ample 170 per cent and in Denmark slightly less than 40 per cent. In Great Britain and 
the Netherlands, statutory pensions are pay-as-you-go systems and funded either with tax 
revenues or insurance contributions. 
Looking at the structure of the pension systems, we can note that the occupational 
pensions in the countries under review have shifted increasingly from defined benefit pension 
systems (DB) to defined contribution pension systems (DC). In Norway, nearly all new 
occupational pension systems are DC systems. The same applies to nearly all private-sector 
occupational pension systems in Great Britain and Denmark. Sweden forms no exception, 
with most occupational pension systems being DC systems. The statutory earnings-related 
pension systems in Norway and Sweden are notional defined contribution systems (NDC).
Of the reviewed countries, the DB systems have retained their position only in the 
Netherlands and in Finland, although both include features of DC systems (in Finland e.g. the 
life expectancy coefficient, and in the Netherlands, the effect of the investment risk through 
indexation). In the Netherlands, the earnings-related pension provision is fully dependent on 
occupational pensions, while the earnings-related system in Finland is statutory.
Thus, investment operations, along with investment regulations, play a significant role 
in each country under review in terms of the overall pension provision. If the return on 
investments is low or even negative, the effect on the pension level of an individual pensioner 
in DC systems is considerable. In DB systems, the result is an increase in the pension 
contribution level.
From the point of view of investment regulations, the structure of the system makes a 
difference: DC systems are fully funded regardless of the investment returns, while in DB 
systems, the monitoring of the solvency ratio is closely linked to investment regulation. 
For example, when the solvency ratio drops below 100 per cent in the DB systems in the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Great Britain, the pension provider has to make changes 
to its investment allocations or the pension contribution level. In DC systems, the supervision 
and regulation focus mainly on an adequate level of the employers’ and employees’ pension 
contributions and the composition of the investment portfolio of the insured.
The management of occupational pensions is decentralised to several actors. In the 
Netherlands, the industry-specific funds hold a significant position and a clear majority of 
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the active members are members of such funds. Industry-wide pension funds have long 
traditions. For example, the largest fund, the pension fund of public-sector employees, the 
ABP, was established already in 1836. In Great Britain, in an Anglo-American manner, 
occupational pensions have been arranged through company-specific funds, with private-
sector systems numbering tens of thousands. However, the membership volumes of new 
workplace pension scheme providers (e.g. NEST) are rapidly growing, and in the future, 
these general workplace funds may become the most significant form of pension provision.
In addition to company pension funds and industry-wide pension funds, life insurance 
companies hold a considerable part of the occupational pension markets in the countries 
under review. In the Nordic countries, occupational pensions have traditionally been 
arranged in life insurance companies. For example, in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the 
life insurance companies’ allocation of the total premium income of occupational pensions 
is 75–80 per cent. Table 3.1 presents a general overview of the central features of the 
occupational pensions of the reviewed countries.
Table 3.1.
Occupational pensions and pension assets in countries under review.
The Nether-
lands
Great 
Britain
Norway Sweden Denmark Finland*
Coverage of labour 
market pensions, %
90 50 90 90 90 100
Membership of 
occupational 
pensions
Collective 
agreements
Employer 
and union 
contracts
Act
Collective 
agreements
Collective 
agreements
Act
Occupational 
pensions % of GDP
160 135 45
57 +17 
(premium 
pension)
137+36 (ATP) 52
Buffer funds
% of GDP
- - 173 31 - 28
 DC or DB system DB DC/DB DC/DB DC/DB
DC, guaranteed 
return
DB
Supervision
Central 
bank (De 
Nederland- 
sche Bank– 
DNB)
Pension 
authority 
(The 
Pensions 
Regulator)
Financial 
supervisory 
authority 
(Finans-
tilsynet)
Financial 
supervisory 
authority
(Finans-
inspektion)
Financial 
supervisory 
authority 
(Finans-
tilsynet)
Financial 
supervisory 
authority
No of pension 
investors
ca 400 ca 50 000 ca 100 ca 270 75 35
 * The Finnish earnings-related pension has been classified as an occupational pension in the table.
From each country, we have selected 1–3 actors, who manage considerably large assets (see 
Table 3.2). As for the Finnish pension insurers and the Swedish AP buffer funds, the data 
is presented per groups of actors rather than per individual actors. In addition to the actor 
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or group specific data, we have in places included average data of OECD countries for 
comparison72.
Finland is represented by two different groups in the comparison: private-sector pension 
insurers and public-sector pension institutions, the State Pension Fund and Keva.73 A central 
difference between these two groups is that the national solvency regulations apply only 
to private-sector pension insurers. Private-sector pension funds are not subject to these 
regulations, but they have their own actor-specific limitations. Along with private-sector 
pension insurers, they have to make sure that their investments are secure, profitable, 
diversified and liquid. In addition, the Ministry of Finance issues instructions and decrees 
for the State Pension Fund. According to the regulations (13.11.2007) valid at the time 
of making this survey, the State Pension Fund had to abide by the following restrictions:
• Investments in fixed-income securities must amount to at least 45 per cent.
• Investments in equities may not exceed 45 per cent.
• Other investments may not exceed 12 per cent of the value of the fund.
Table 3.2.
Selected actors and assets.*
System Assets per 31.12.2013
The Netherlands
ABP DB, fully funded €bn 325.2
PFZW DB, fully funded €bn 137.3
Great Britain
BT DB, fully funded €bn 46.6 (GDP €bn 39.6)
USS DB, fully funded €bn 50.3 (GDP €bn 42.7)
Norway
GPFG Buffer fund €bn 645.3 (NOKbn 5 038.0)
Sweden
AP1–AP4 and AP6 Buffer fund for old-age pensions €bn 122.2 mrd (SEKbn 1 057.6)
Alecta DB/DC, fully funded €bn 69.7 (SEKbn 602.8)
AMF DC, fully funded €bn 42.1 (SEKbn 363.8)
Finland
Public-sector earnings-related pensions Buffer fund €bn 56.9
Private-sector earnings-related pensions DB, partially funded €bn 105.2
Denmark
ATP DC, fully funded €bn 79.4 (DKKbn 592.3)
Industriens Pension DC, fully funded €bn 15.6 (DKKbn 116.1)
* Amounts in euros have been calculated using the average exchange rates for 2013 of the Bank of Finland.
72 Data: OECD, Pension Markets in Focus. http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/pensionmarketsinfocus.
htm.
73 In January 2014, earnings-related pensions were handled by 32 different pension institutions. Private-sector 
pension insurance was managed by 6 earnings-related pension insurance companies, 14 company pension funds and 6 
industry-wide pension funds, as well by the Farmers’ Social Insurance Institution Mela and the Seafarer’s Pensions Fund.
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The Swedish AP funds are a combination of the data of five buffer funds (AP1–AP4 and 
AP6) of the statutory earnings-related pension system. The funds are legally sovereign with 
their own investment and ownership policies and risk management plans. They are not under 
the direct steering of the Swedish government or Parliament, but they are under obligation 
to compile their annual financial reports to the country’s government. The investments are 
steered in acts that define buffer funds. These acts include quantitative investment limitations 
and a low risk level requirement.74 For example, at least 30 per cent of the capital must be 
invested in bonds with a low credit and liquidity risk. The government (SOU 2012:53; Skr 
2013/14:13039) and a pension group (Pensionsgruppen) consisting of representatives from 
the different political parties have suggested that the current regulation be replaced by the 
Prudent Persons Principle and that the number of funds be reduced from the current five to 
three in 201675.
The comparison of the life insurance companies handling Swedish occupational pensions 
includes the two largest and oldest private-sector actors: Alecta and AMF Pension. Alecta is 
also the default provider within the ITP scheme for white-collar employees and AMF within 
SAF-LO for blue-collar employees, unless an employee actively makes an investment 
decision and selects another company to manage his or her occupational pension capital. 
In the Netherlands, the largest industry-wide pension funds, the ABP and the PFZW, 
cover an ample third of all persons insured for an occupational pension. Measured in pension 
assets, they manage nearly half of the total Dutch pension assets. Investment regulation is 
governed mainly by the Prudent Person Principle rather than by quantitative regulations. The 
Prudent Person Principle regulates through qualitative principles or criteria. An essential 
feature is also the assessment and monitoring of risk-based solvency. The principles and 
rules of regulation have been entered into the financial assessment framework (FTK), which 
sets the required solvency ratio above the minimum requirement (105%). Under the new 
FTK, which took effect at the beginning of 2015, the required funding has increased by five 
percentage points to approximately 110 per cent.
The Norwegian GPFG is a buffer fund that accumulates a considerable part of its assets 
from oil and gas production income. No pension contributions are steered into the fund, 
nor is it tied down by the solvency regulations that aim at covering the pension liabilities. 
The international GPFG is managed by the Central Bank of Norway, and its operations are 
legislated in a separate act, the Government Pension Fund Act. The fund is part of the state 
budget and the fund’s return is used annually also to cover the state’s budget deficit. The 
fund invests all its assets abroad. The investment operations of the fund are governed by one 
aim: to achieve the highest possible return at a moderate risk level. The Ministry of Finance 
has laid down general guidelines for the GPFG. These guidelines set a target asset allocation 
of 60 per cent in equities, 35–40 per cent in fixed-income securities and up to five per cent 
in real estate (Norges Bank76).
74 Lag (2000:192) om allmänna pensionsfonder (AP-fonder). http://www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/20000192.htm 
75 Pensionsgruppens förslag till förändringar av pensionsöverenskommelsen. 12.3.2014. http://www.apfond6.se/
Global/PDF%20(som%20l%c3%a4nkas%20till)/%c3%96verenskommelse%20om%20vissa%20justeringar%20i%20
pensions%c3%b6verenskommelsen.pdf
76 http://www.nbim.no/en/
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The management of the statutory earnings-related pension system (ATP) is handled 
by a sovereign ATP pension provider governed by the labour market organisations. The 
investments of the ATP are divided into two completely separate investment portfolios 
which are different both functionally and in terms of target-orientation. The aim of the first 
one is to protect the pension liabilities that arise from the guaranteed return promise from 
interest risks (hedge portfolio). As such, pension provider seeks investment returns and 
growth in the solvency margin through a separate investment portfolio, the aim of which is 
to maintain the purchasing power of pensions in the long run. Solvency II does not apply to 
the ATP pension system, which has its own risk management model that is comparable to 
the requirements set by Solvency II. ATP reports its solvency to the Financial Supervisory 
Authority in line with the requirements of Solvency II. The investment operations of an ATP 
institution are regulated in the ATP Act.
In Denmark, occupational pensions are mainly handled by life insurance companies. 
Industriens Pension administrates the pensions of the Confederation of Danish Industries 
(DI) and the Central Organisation of Industrial Employees and covers approximately 
400,000 employees. The decision of the Central Organisation of Industrial Employees at the 
beginning of the 1990s to arrange occupational pensions for its members was crucial for the 
overall development of the occupational pension schemes. 
In Denmark, it is typical for pension arrangements to have a set guaranteed return, which 
means that the pension is secured through a technical rate of interest or some other contract 
rate. The solvency regulations apply to company pension funds and industry-wide pension 
funds which are committed to some kind of pension promise. In 2011, some of the pension 
insurers, including Industriens Pension, abandoned the guarantee returns as part of the 
preparations for the Solvency II regulation which, among other obligations, increases the 
capital requirements. Due to the decline in the interest rate in recent years, it has become 
difficult to accommodate the guaranteed high, up to 4.5 per cent, returns. The Danish FSA 
supervises the solvency of the Danish occupational pension system through stress tests, or 
the so-called traffic light model, which was implemented in 2011. 
We have reviewed two large British pension funds that offer DB pensions: the 
Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS), a pension fund that covers the higher-education 
sector in the UK, and the BT Pension Scheme, which is the UK’s largest corporate defined 
benefit (DB) pension scheme. However, the BT Pension Scheme has been closed to new 
members already from the beginning of the 2000s. Many other private-sector DB schemes 
have faced the same fate in Britain. 
 
3.2 Allocations per investment type
The allocations of the objects under review have been divided into two groups: investments 
in fixed-income securities and other investments. Investments in fixed-income securities 
include, among others, investments in cash, money markets, loans and bonds. 
Other investments include investments in listed and unlisted equities, capital investments, 
hedge funds, real estate, commodities and infrastructure. Of these, listed equities generally 
form the largest group. This rough division is used to highlight the differences in the risk 
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levels of portfolios. In smaller-risk portfolios, the share of investments in fixed-income 
securities is larger. Correspondingly, in portfolios with larger risks, the share of other types 
of investments is larger.
The group of investments in fixed-income securities is not homogeneous but, in terms 
of its risk profile, it is very different for different investors depending on the selected 
investment objects. One investor may put more emphasis on corporate loans with good credit 
qualities while another may emphasise government bonds in developing markets and a third 
one corporate loans with credit ratings below the investment category. If the fixed income 
allocations of a reviewed object have some such clear emphasis, which can be assumed to 
have a significant effect on the return, we have mentioned the emphasis.
In our review, the most typical allocation of pension assets was a combination in which 
investments in fixed-income securities accounted for 40–60 per cent (mostly closer to 40) 
and the rest consisted of other investments (mainly listed shares) (Figures 3.1 and 3.2).
A few actors under review deviated from this 40/60 allocation. The Danish ATP 
represents an allocation in which 80 per cent are investments in fixed-income securities and 
20 per cent other investments. The main reason for the noticeably high focus on investments 
in fixed-income securities is the fund’s investment strategy, in which the protection of 
pension liabilities plays a considerable role. As for the ATP, the overall allocation consists 
of a combination of a so-called investment portfolio and a hedge portfolio. In addition to the 
hedging strategy, the allocations of the ATP strongly focus on, among other things, corporate 
loans and inflation-linked instruments. Another extreme represented in the review is that of 
the USS of Great Britain, whose allocation in investments in fixed-income securities has 
been only approximately 20 per cent in the long run while other investments (equities) have 
accounted for 80 per cent. However, in recent years, the fixed income allocation has risen to 
almost 30 per cent.
Figure 3.1.
Share of investments in fixed-income securities 2009–2013, %.
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Figure 3.2.
Share of investments in fixed-income securities of all investments 2004–2013, %.
ATP (Denmark)
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(Denmark)
Alecta (Sweden)
Finnish
public-sector
pension insurers
AMF (Sweden)
Finnish
private-sector
pension insurers
GPFG (Norway) AP-funds(Sweden)
USS 
(Great Britain)
2004 59 66 62 46 43 62 59 39 11
2005 60 60 55 45 41 56 58 37 8
2006 62 59 52 43 38 49 59 37 9
2007 67 64 52 45 50 44 53 39 14
2008 77 70 66 52 58 56 50 43 18
2009 83 58 54 49 60 51 38 37 16
2010 85 61 50 46 57 42 39 38 20
2011 81 67 64 50 62 48 41 41 19
2012 81 61 60 48 48 46 38 39 24
2013 83 59 54 46 45 42 37 35 27
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There have been a few different paths in the changes of fixed income allocations in the last 
ten years (Figure 3.2). These allocations have increased with the reviewed extremes in terms 
of allocation: the ATP, which already focuses heavily on fixed-income securities, and the 
USS, which places a small emphasis on investments in fixed-income securities. The fixed 
income allocations have been reduced in the last ten years among Finnish private-sector 
pension insurers and the Norwegian GPFG. The fixed income allocations have remained 
nearly unchanged in the Finnish and Swedish buffer funds, the Finnish public-sector pension 
insurers and the Swedish AP funds. These changes and non-changes that have taken place 
during the last ten years appear to be trends and aimed-for long-term goals.
Another trend is represented by actors (the Swedish AMF and Alecta and the Danish 
Industriens Pension), whose allocations change along with changes in circumstances. In 
the crisis years, the share of the fixed income allocation increases and, correspondingly, 
in a more favourable market situation, it decreases. When data on the purchase and selling 
of investments is lacking, we cannot say which share of the change in allocation is due to 
the market situation (in times of crises, the market value and share of investments in fixed-
income securities rise while the market value and share of more risk-prone investments 
decrease) and which is a result of an active change in allocations to less risky investments 
by purchasing more investments in fixed-income securities and by selling more risk-prone 
investments. What we can observe from the data, however, is that the changes in allocation 
of the AMF, Alecta and Industriens Pension are not always going in the same direction. This 
would indicate that each actor reacts to the market circumstances and their expected changes 
according to their own view and at their own time.
The effect of changing market conditions is also evident in the allocations of Finnish 
private-sector pension insurers. As stated before, the private-sector fixed income allocation 
has been reduced. During weak economic situations, the share of investments in fixed-
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income securities has increased. As the situation has improved, the share of investments in 
fixed-income securities has been reduced.
Due to the low interest rates in the last few years, we observed a reduction in the fixed 
income allocation in nearly all actors under review (see Figure 3.1). Based on the data it 
is impossible to establish, however, how much of the change in allocation was a result of 
active measures and how much was caused by the market situation. It is likely that part of 
the reduction in the fixed income allocation is due to the selling of such investments. The 
released assets have then been invested into other instruments. With the selling of interest-
bearing papers, the actors have prepared themselves for the time when the interest levels 
will rise, at which time the return of these instruments will be in the red due to the reduced 
price of investments in fixed-income securities. On the other hand, along with the rise of 
the equity markets, the market values of equity investments and other riskier instruments 
have risen, which has led to an increase of the share of these investments and a decrease 
of investments in fixed-income securities in investment portfolios. Although the share of 
investments in fixed-income securities has mainly been reduced in the last years, it has 
grown among those representing the extremes: the ATP and the USS.
3.3 Regional distribution of investments
We have examined the regional investment operations of the actors under review by dividing 
the investments into two groups: domestic and foreign investments. The share of domestic 
investments varies greatly from one actor to another (see Figure 3.3). The Norwegian GPFG 
is at one end of the scale, investing all its assets outside Norway. Also the Dutch (10–
20%), the Finnish public-sector pension insurers (ca. 20%) and the Danish (20–30%) have 
only minor domestic investments. At the other end of the scale, with a considerable share 
of domestic investments, are the Swedish (50–60%), the British (40–50%) and the Finnish 
private-sector pension insurers (30–40%).77
In the last ten years, there have been some changes in the share of domestic investments 
(see Figure 3.4). As for two Swedish actors, the domestic share has dropped from 50–70 per 
cent to 50–60 per cent. The domestic share of AMF’s investment portfolio dropped before 
the beginning of the financial crisis and has thereafter risen to the levels of some ten years 
ago. The share of domestic investments of Alecta has decreased, however, by 20 per cent in 
the last decade. The share of domestic investments of the British USS has also been reduced: 
from 50 towards 40 per cent, occasionally even lower. Along with the AMF, the development 
of the domestic investments of Finnish private-sector pension insurers reflects the financial 
crisis: before the crisis, the share of domestic investments was on the wane, but as a result 
of the crisis, it grew. In the last few years, the share of domestic investments has subsided 
again. In the last ten years, the share has been between 30 and 40 per cent. The share of 
domestic investments of Finnish public-sector investors (ca 20%) and the Norwegian GPFG 
(0%) has remained unchanged in the last ten years.
77 We found no comparable data of the regional allocation of the investments of the following actors: the ATP, PFZW 
and the AP funds.
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Figure 3.3.
Share of domestic investments 2009–2013, %.
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Figure 3.4.
Share of domestic investments 2009–2013, %.
AMF (Sweden) Alecta (Sweden) USS (Great Britain) Finnish private-sector
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GPFG (Norway)
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2012 58 54 36 38 21 0
2013 57 51 44 36 21 0
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3.4 The return and their ratio to the investment allocations and regional 
 distribution
By examining the nominal annual return78, we note that the returns of the different pension 
investors follow very similar paths (see Figure 3.5) which goes hand in hand with the 
development of the investment markets. A comparison with OECD countries shows that 
78 The nominal return of each actor is in the domestic currency of the said actor. The nature of the investment operations 
and the return are affected by the fact that the pension liabilities and the paid pensions are in the domestic currency.
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the reviewed actors and groups of actors are among the most successful pension investors. 
Their average annual real return79 is 1.1–5.7 percentage points above the average return 
(2.3%) of private pension assets of the OECD countries in the last ten years80 (see Figure 
3.6). This better-than-average performance of the OECD countries can partly be explained 
by the fact that we selected some of the largest pension investors in the reviewed countries 
for our survey.
Figure 3.5.
Nominal, annual net return 2004–2013, %.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GPFG (Norway) 8,9 11,1 7,9 4,3 -23,3 25,6 9,6 -2,5 13,4 16,0
AP-funds(Sweden) 11,2 17,6 10,8 4,3 -21,6 19,5 10,4 -1,9 11,7 13,6
USS (Great Britain) 8,9 24,0 9,9 7,5 -27,2 20,7 11,7 0,3 11,4 12,8
Alecta (Sweden) 10,3 14,3 8,4 4,8 -7,4 12,8 9,6 -2,1 11,4 10,2
AMF (Sweden) 9,7 16,0 9,6 4,9 -6,6 12,6 9,8 2,4 8,0 9,3
Finnish private-sector pension insurers 7,8 11,5 8,7 5,4 -15,1 13,9 10,7 -3,0 8,4 8,3
Finnish public-sector pension insurers 8,7 14,9 10,8 5,0 -19,4 18,0 12,1 -2,3 12,4 7,4
Industriens Pension (Denmark) 10,3 17,3 7,7 0,6 4,4 13,0 18,1 4,0 12,9 6,7
ATP (Denmark) 18,8 20,6 1,2 -2,6 18,8 2,0 17,2 26,2 9,9 -5,7
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The return history of the Danish actors is more countercyclical than that of the others. The 
range of return is also among the narrowest of the reviewed countries. However, what is of 
most significance is that the Danish actors have managed to keep the centre of the range at 
+10 per cent in the long run (7, 10 and 15 years). The annual return ranges around this centre 
by +/- 15 percentage points. The negative return has ranged between 0 and approximately 
-5 per cent. The positive return has ranged between 0 and approximately +25 per cent. This 
success is also evident in the high long-term average annual real return (see Figure 3.6).
 
79 The long-term average annual return has been calculated as a geometrical average time-weighted return (TWR) of 
the total annual return. As for the actors, we have used the total annual return reported by the actors themselves. As 
for the Finnish groups of insurers, we have used the groups’ annual, nominal average returns, which have been formed 
of the capital-weighted total annual return of the actors who belong to the group. The data stems from the database of 
The Finnish Pension Alliance TELA. As for the Swedish AP funds, the group-specific annual average returns reported by 
the Swedish Pensions Agency have been used. (When calculating the real return, we have used the data of the OECD 
database on the development of the consumer prices (consumer prices – all items index) (http://stats.oecd.org/index.
aspx?queryid=22519#). For each year, we have used the index point of December so that the change in consumer prices 
is for the same period (the calendar year) as the return.
80 The average annual real return of the OECD countries for 2013 was not available. Therefore we have presented the 
average for the OECD countries using the return of the period 2003–2012, and for the other objects of review we have 
used a more recent return, i.e. that of the years 2004–2013. By using the return for the period 2003–2012 also for the 
other reviewed actors, we received the return range of 3.5–9.4% presented in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6.
Average annual real return 2004–201381 average value of OECD countries’ pension assets 2003–
2012), %.
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Underlying the success of the Danish pension insurers is probably the investment strategy 
they use, in which the hedging of pension liabilities plays a significant role. Since the 
hedging has been taken into account, the overall portfolio is very fixed-income weighted. 
The nature of such a portfolio reduces the return variation compared to a portfolio that 
is equity weighted. Although the portfolio is fixed-income weighted and could be thought 
to form a combination of a low risk and a low return, the portfolio, with the exception 
of the hedges, is formed of profitable investment instruments. As mentioned earlier, the 
Danish fixed income allocations are complexly formed and include mainly other than low-
risk government bonds of industrial countries. In addition, the Danish prefer inflation-linked 
instruments. A portfolio equipped with such a hedging strategy seems to work better than a 
more risky portfolio without the equivalent hedging strategy (see Figure 3.7). In the countries 
under review, the return history of the other pension investors than the Danish ones are more 
prone to follow the cycle of the investment markets (see Figure 3.5). Another difference 
compared to the Danish is that the return fluctuation range is broader. On average, the larger 
the share in the portfolio of other investments than investments in fixed-income securities, 
the broader the return fluctuation range. When the centre of the long-term (7/10/15 years) 
Danish return fluctuation rate is approximately +10 per cent, the equivalent centre of the 
other reviewed countries was between -3 and +3 per cent in the same period. The annual 
return of the other investors than the Danish ones fluctuated on average on both sides of zero 
with approximately +/- 10–25 percentage points.
Although the positive top years have been as good as those of the Danish, with returns 
of about 25 per cent, the negative years have been considerably weaker with return rates of 
81 In 2004–2013, the average real return of private-sector pension insurers was 3.4 per cent. The actor-specific 
average annual real return of the largest actors ranged between 2.0 and 3.8 per cent. The equivalent group-level return 
of the Finnish public-sector pension insurers was 4.3 per cent and the equivalent fluctuation range of the actors 3.8–7.4 
per cent. In 2004–2013, the average real return of the entire earnings-related pension field in Finland was 3.7 per cent.
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even below -25 per cent. These weak years will weigh heavily for a long time on the average 
annual real returns (see Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.7.
Average real total annual return for 10 years (2004–2013) vs. the range of more risky allocations 
(other than investments in fixed-income securities) (2004–2013), %.
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Based on the data, it would seem that pension investors can manage with a more risky 
strategy in periods with fewer major negative development years in the financial markets. 
In our study, such a period occurred between 2009 and 2013 (see Figures 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10). 
This five-year-period is marked by strongly developing equity markets and a bouncing back 
from the year 2008, which entailed the steepest fall in the financial crisis. In an inductive 
money market environment, riskier strategies are more successful. Although this five-year 
period as a whole has been a time of strongly developing financial markets, the years have 
been very different due to the various stages of the financial crisis. A slightly negative 
year, such as 2011, has not impacted in any significant way the overall return development 
between 2009–2013 of investors who have focused on riskier investments than fixed-income 
securities.
When the review period includes even one extremely bad year in the financial market, 
such as 2008, an investor with a hedging strategy performs better than one with a traditional 
allocation portfolio, in which there are less investments in fixed-income securities and more 
risky investments (see Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7). The review yielded a parallel result during 
all reviewed periods in which the year 2008 was included, i.e. in periods of seven, ten and 
fifteen years82. Underlying the good long-term return development of a low-risk and hedged 
investment portfolio such as the Danish seems to be, to a significant degree, the ability to 
hedge, i.e. to limit the losses in extremely bad market situations.
82 The figures for the seven (2007–2013) and the fifteen (1999–2013) year periods corresponding to Figures 3.5–3.10 
are included only in the original Finnish version in Appendix 1.
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Figure 3.8.
Nominal, annual net return 2009–2013, %.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GPFG (Norway) 25,6 9,6 -2,5 13,4 16,0
AP-funds (Sweden) 19,5 10,4 -1,9 11,7 13,6
USS (Great-Britain) 20,7 11,7 0,3 11,4 12,8
Alecta (Sweden) 12,8 9,6 -2,1 11,4 10,2
AMF (Sweden) 12,6 9,8 2,4 8,0 9,3
Finnish private-sector pension insurers 13,9 10,7 -3,0 8,4 8,3
Finnish public-sector pension insurers 18,0 12,1 -2,3 12,4 7,4
Industriens Pension (Denmark) 13,0 18,1 4,0 12,9 6,7
ABP (The Netherlands) 20,2 13,5 3,3 13,7 6,2
PFZW (The Netherlands) 17,6 12,6 8,4 13,4 3,7
BT Pension Scheme (Great Britain) 12,2 11,8 1,7 7,5 3,7
ATP (Denmark) 2,0 17,2 26,2 9,9 -5,7
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Figure 3.9.
Average annual real return 2009–201383 (average value of OECD countries’ pension assets 
2009–2012), %.
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83 In 2009–2013, the average real return of private-sector pension insurers was 5.6 per cent. The actor-specific 
average annual real return of the largest actors ranged between 3.3 and 6.0 per cent. The equivalent group-level return 
of the Finnish public-sector pension insurers was 7.3 per cent and the equivalent fluctuation range of the actors 4.3–7.9 
per cent. In 2009–2013, the average real return of the entire earnings-related pension field in Finland was 6.2 per cent.
In 1999–2013, the average real return of private-sector earnings-related pension insurers was 3.4 per cent. The 
actor-specific average annual real return of the largest actors ranged between 2.1 and 3.8 per cent. The equivalent group-
level return of the Finnish public-sector pension insurers was 3.5 per cent and the equivalent fluctuation range of the 
actors 3.0–4.3 per cent. The average real return of the entire earnings-related pension field in Finland was 3.7 per cent.
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Figure 3.10.
Average real total annual return for five years (2009–2013) vs. the range of more risky allocations 
(other than investments in fixed-income securities) (2009–2013), %.
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Based on the data, the return is very different even if the share of the riskier allocation would 
be of the same size. A typical reviewed allocation, where the investments in fixed-income 
securities are 40–60 per cent and, correspondingly, other (more risky) investments are 60–40 
per cent, had average annual real returns in the past five years of 4.8–10.2 per cent (see Figure 
3.9). It would seem that the returns of 40/60 allocations are explained by something else than 
the rough division of investment categories used in our survey. 
Based on the data of our survey, the effect of the regional division on the return of 
investment operations can be analysed only on a rough level as separate data on the return 
on the actors’ or groups of actors’ investments are not available. In the short term, the 
development of one individual country’s GDP84 can act as a rough indicator of the return 
development of that country’s financial markets85. When we compare the development of 
the domestic GDP, the domestic ratio and the total return of the investments of the countries 
under review in this survey, we can find a few interfaces (see Figure 3.11).86
84 As for the development of the GDP, we have used the data of the OECD data base of the annual growth of the GDP, 
http:// stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=22519#. The long-term average annual growth percentages of GDP have 
been formed as the geometrical average of the annual growth percentages.
85 Keith Wade and Anja May have found the positive correlation between the growth in GDP and the return development 
of the equities markets in the short term, marked by a low growth in the GDP. In that case, as there is no pressure due to 
inflation, the development of the equity markets is affected more by the growth in GDP than by the monetary policy of 
central banks. This type of period has reigned since the financial crisis, as of the year 2009. https://c.na3.content.force.
com/servlet/servlet.ImageServer?id=015500000012xSeAAI&oid=00D300000000M2BEAU
86 The GPFG does not invest in domestic instruments, so we have excluded it from this review.
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Figure 3.11.
Assessment of effect of domestic investments on the overall return 2009–201387, %.
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The Swedish actors have a high percentage of domestic investments. The Swedish GDP has 
grown more strongly than that of the other reviewed countries. The high overall returns of 
the Swedish actors can be partly explained by the favourable domestic returns. The overall 
return of the Dutch and the Danish investors are also high, but the situation is the opposite 
of the Swedish: the domestic GDP has been reduced, and it has been profitable to make 
only small-scale investments in domestic instruments. As for the British actors, the returns 
can apparently be explained by the investment allocation rather than by the geographical 
distribution as both of the British actors invest in domestic instruments approximately to the 
same extent. The returns of the USS are higher than those of the BT. The allocation of the 
USS is more risky, including more other investments (USS: 80%, BT: 60%) than investments 
in fixed-income securities (USS: 20%, BT: 40%).
There are no big differences between the Finnish pension insurer groups in terms of how 
much is invested in fixed-income securities and how much in other investment instruments. 
In the geographical distribution of the investments, there is a considerable difference: the 
Finnish public-sector pension insurers invest less in domestic instruments (ca 20%) than do 
the Finnish private-sector pension insurers (ca 30–40%). The return of the Finnish private-
sector pension insurers has been higher in the last 17 years than that of the Finnish public-
sector pension insurers. The difference in return has grown in particular between 2009 and 
2013. In this same time period, the development of the Finnish GDP has remained clearly 
below that of the other reviewed countries. The Finnish GDP was reduced in 2009–2013 by, 
on average, 1.0 per cent per year. The growth rates of the other GDP in the other reviewed 
countries were between -0.7 and +1.3 per cent. The average annual GDP growth rate in the 
OECD countries was +0.8 per cent.
87 The share of domestic investments in Figure 3.11 is presented as the arithmetic average of the domestic allocations 
at the end of the period 2009–2013.
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It would appear that the return difference between the Finnish public-sector and 
private-sector pension insurers is explained by the fact that the private-sector actors invest 
considerably more in domestic instruments than do the public-sector actors. 
In recent years, the return of domestic instruments has been weighed down by a poor 
economic outlook. The moderate returns88 of, in particular, the Finnish investments in 
equities is partly explained by the weak growth and growth outlook. For investors in fixed-
income securities, the Finnish instruments offer low returns due to their fairly good average 
credit rating. The Finnish government itself has one of the highest credit rates. Of the 
domestic instruments, investments in real estate form a considerable investment object for 
the pension insurers: approximately 30 per cent of the domestic investments are investments 
in real estate89. In the last five years (2009–2013), the return of earnings-related pension 
insurers’ investments in real estate have fallen behind the return of investments in fixed-
income securities and equities90.
88 http://www.tela.fi/instancedata/prime_product_julkaisu/tela/embeds/telawwwstructure/17445_Sijoitusten_
tuotot_2014-q2.ppt
89 http://www.tela.fi/instancedata/prime_product_julkaisu/tela/embeds/telawwwstructure/15438_Sijoituskanta_
Suomeen_pitka_aikasarja_uudet_varit.pdf
90 http://www.tela.fi/instancedata/prime_product_julkaisu/tela/embeds/telawwwstructure/17445_Sijoitusten_
tuotot_2014-q2.ppt
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4 Conclusions
The aim of the survey has been to provide a general picture of the investment regulations for 
pension providers, the investment allocations’ risk levels, the diversification of investments 
and risks and the returns on pension assets received in the reviewed countries in the last few 
years. In the following, we present answers to the questions posed in the introduction.
4.1 Supranational regulation
Although the EU has a considerable influence on the harmonization of the investment 
regulations, the national limitations regarding the choice of investment objects differ from 
each other. For example, the Solvency II regulations do not apply to statutory actors or 
buffer funds in Sweden or Finland. In the Nordic countries examined in this review, with 
the exception of Denmark, buffer funds are used to finance statutory pensions. Yet many 
different types of regulations apply to buffer funds, including regulations on investments. 
The regulations are often included in the acts or decrees governing the funds and, principally, 
the regulations address amounts, the relative share of asset types or geographical limitations. 
However, the buffer funds may set ethical rules or principles for their investment operations 
that are qualitative.
As for supplementary pensions, many EU countries have posed additional requirements 
for the operations of pension providers in addition to the minimum requirements of the 
EU directives. These additional requirements differ from one EU Member State to another. 
Furthermore, there are actor-specific differences in national solvency regulations between, 
for example, company pension funds and life insurance companies.
Solvency regulations usually apply only to DB schemes. Although DC schemes are 
becoming increasingly common, a considerable part of the pension assets continue to be 
linked to the financing of DB pensions. In the DC schemes, there are no set benefits promised 
beforehand, and therefore the actors are not bound by pension liabilities and related solvency 
regulations. The investment risk has been shifted to the insured, because the benefits are 
defined based on the paid contributions and the net return received of the collected assets 
that have been invested. Nevertheless, in some DC schemes, a guaranteed return has been 
defined for the pension capital. This is a very common praxis in, for example, Denmark, and 
requires that the actors provide for meeting the promise by hedging their pension liabilities. 
In addition, if the insured in a DC scheme purchases an annuity with his or her pension 
capital, a technical provision that falls subject to solvency regulations arises for the life 
insurance company. 
As a rule, DB pension schemes are very different from DC schemes in terms of the 
investor profile. In DB schemes, the investment decisions rest with institutional investors 
who have to take into account the prudence of the benefits. In DC schemes, the individuals 
can make investment decisions at their own risk. The solvency margin requirements affect 
the DB pension providers’ opportunities and willingness to take risks and thus limit the 
actors’ opportunities to expand their riskier investments.
52 FINNISH CENTRE FOR PENSIONS, SURVEYS
4.2 Investments’ risk levels in different countries
The pension providers are long-term investors, and according to the regulations of the different 
countries, the pension assets must be invested profitably and prudently. The operations under 
this long-term aim are clearly visible also in the pension providers’ investment allocations, 
in which investments in fixed-income securities play an important role. Our survey shows 
that no major changes have taken place in the last 10 years when it comes to the share of 
investments in fixed-income securities. In Sweden and Denmark, the share has somewhat 
increased, while the share of investments in fixed-income securities of the Norwegian GPFG 
and the Finnish private-sector pension providers has declined.
In connection with the implementation of the Solvency II Directive in the EU area, 
the regulation has been proved to have a steering effect on the allocation of assets. The 
directive has steered life and non-life insurance companies in the EU area into debt-like 
investments since the directive is lighter for debt instruments than for capital instruments. 
On the other hand, the regulations of the directive are under assessment and may become 
less steering91. A comparison shows that the national solvency regulation also steers the 
investment allocations of other actors in the same direction. On the other hand, the effects 
of the solvency regulations on the investment operations of a single pension provider are 
rather minor when and if the pension provider has a generally good solvency. In that case, 
their own risk management rather than the solvency requirements steer their investment 
decisions.
In our survey, we analysed the rough difference in the risk levels of the investment 
portfolios by separating investments in fixed-income securities from other investments. 
The main thought was that those who operate with a smaller risk have a larger share of 
investments in fixed-income securities in their portfolios, while the investment portfolios of 
those who operate with higher risks include a larger share of other investments.
Our survey shows, however, that the group of investments in fixed-income securities 
is not homogeneous but, in terms of its risk profile, very different for different investors 
depending on the selected investment objects. The Danish ATP stands out in particular as it 
seeks for a return, not through government bonds but through corporate loans and inflation-
linked bonds with a good credit rating. This way, the investment portfolio is not as low-risk 
as could be expected by a simple division into investments in fixed-income securities and 
other investments.
The growth of the share of investments in fixed-income securities also depends on 
structural and investment technical reasons relating to pension systems. For example, in 
British DB pension systems, the share of equities has dropped in the last ten years from an 
ample 60 per cent to approximately 35 per cent of the overall investments. Underlying this 
change is the closing of DB systems to new members and the hedging of current benefits 
by shifting to instruments with a smaller value fluctuation range. The actors thus aim at 
reducing the market risks of the assets that cover the pension liabilities. These risks are 
caused, in particular, by the fluctuation in the investment return of the equity markets. This 
is part of the more general development trend that can be observed also in other countries 
91 See e.g Techical Findings in the Long-Term Guarantees Assessment, EIOPA/13/296, Jun 2013.
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(so-called liability-driven investment [LDI] or asset-liability matching [ALM]), with which 
pension liabilities are hedged by corresponding investments in fixed-income securities. 
This is a central part of the investment strategy of, for example, the Danish ATP. Also in 
the Netherlands, the share of investments in fixed-income securities has grown in the last 
decade, partly due to the aforementioned hedging strategies from approximately 40 per 
cent to more than 50 per cent of the overall investments from 2007 to 2014. Underlying 
this change is the replacing of the fixed discount rate used to calculate pension liabilities 
with a market rate. Investors have tried to hedge their investments against these changes by 
increasing the share of interest-bearing papers.
It must be noted that changes in the share of investments in fixed-income securities may 
also, especially short-term, be caused by the market situation (in times of crises, the market 
value and share of investments in fixed-income securities of the total portfolio increase 
while the market value and share of riskier investments decrease). Based on the data we 
cannot say, however, whether this is the case or whether the allocation has been actively 
changed to make it less risky by buying more investments in fixed-income securities and 
selling investments with higher risks.
To counterbalance the hedging of the changes in technical provisions, the reviewed 
countries are looking for higher returns by investing in equities and other high-yielding 
investment instruments. In Finland, for example, obstacles that have prevented the 
steering of investment structures have been removed so that the investment operations can 
increasingly focus on equity markets. Ambachtsheer (2013) suggested that pension assets 
be diversified abroad and that nearly all investments, up to 80 per cent, be allocated into 
equities since the financial risk of our system mainly lies in the pay-as-you-go system. An 
equivalent 80-per-cent equity weight of the reviewed countries can be found only in the 
Swedish premium pension system, which holds a marginal share of the overall pension 
provision. Of the selected actors, the USS in Great Britain has an equity weight that exceeds 
70 per cent, albeit the percentage has been reduced in the last few years, as in general in 
Britain. In Finland, the equity weight is now 40 per cent, which is at an average level in the 
reviewed countries (20–60%). In the agreement of the 2017 pension reform, the solvency 
framework is suggested to be changed so that the private sector pension providers’ equity 
weight would increase further. However, according to the agreement on the pension reform, 
the equity weight of the investments of a single earnings-related pension insurance provider 
shall be set at a maximum of 60 per cent of all investments. The labour market organisations 
suggest that this change come into force at the beginning of 201792.
Excluded from our review is a closer examination of the other investment instruments. 
For example, the narrowed leeway of public finances in many countries as a result of the 
financial crisis has raised hopes that pension funds will participate more actively to assist 
economic growth through long-term investments that are currently too much for the public 
economy. For example, the OECD (201493) hopes to see banks accompanied by institutional 
investors which, by investing in infrastructure, could lay the ground for new economic 
92 Agreement on 2017 Earnings-related Pension Reform http://www.etk.fi/en/service/pension_reform_in_ 
2017/1504/pension_reform_in_2017
93 Institutional Investors and Long-term Investment. http://www.oecd.org/finance/OECD-LTI-project.pdf
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growth. According to an assessment by the OECD, less than one per cent of the state buffer 
funds and the large private actors’ pension assets were invested in infrastructure projects in 
2012 (OECD 2014, 14). 
4.3 Regional distribution of investments in reviewed countries
Investments tend to be diversified abroad to a considerable degree in order to increase the 
risk-bearing capacity of pension insurance companies and pension funds. According to Sorsa 
(2012), foreign investments were viewed sceptically only two decades ago due to, among 
other things, exchange and liquidity risks. European pension investors differed from each 
other considerably; partly in terms of the investment opportunities they offered and, partly, 
in terms of the actors that dominated the local financial sectors and their modes of operation. 
Traditionally, pension assets were invested in domestic bonds, because investing in equities 
and other securities was difficult due to taxation, accounting based on historical appreciation, 
strict investment regulations and bad previous experiences (see also Davis 2002; Harrison 
1997).
The development of EU legislation has unified the investment regulations of European 
countries. One key factor is the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which has removed 
the internal exchange risks of the Eurozone. In addition, the investment regulations have 
been unified and the obstacles for investing have been reduced globally through the actions 
of international organisations such as the OECD (STM 2010). This way, the premises 
for investing abroad have been increased in the last decades also through supranational 
regulative measures and the development of shared structures. 
In Finland, the internationalisation of investments has been particularly significant 
since the premium lending of earnings-related pension providers was the largest form of 
investment as late as in the 1990s. As the changes to the regulations concerning investments 
in the earnings-related pension scheme came into effect towards the end of the 1990s, the 
earnings-related pension insurance companies began redirecting their investment operations 
from premium lending to companies to equity investments in Finland and abroad. The other 
pension providers rapidly followed suit in the early 2000s. Sorsa (2010, 151–159) describes 
the decade following 1997 as a decade of a fundamental change of direction from supporting 
the national economic development to professionally managing international investments.
Pension assets have also often been linked to hopes of securing employment and 
economic growth through domestic investments. The buffer funds, in particular, are linked 
to socio-political goals. However, in its report on the investment operations of pension 
funds, the OECD (2013) has observed that there are no considerable differences between 
the investment allocations of buffer funds and private actors in this respect. In our survey, a 
review of the portfolios of Norwegian and Swedish buffer funds shows that the investment 
decisions are made first and foremost to finance earnings-related pensions and to diversify 
risks rather than from the point of view of socio-political goals. A characterising feature of 
the Norwegian GPFG is that, according to its regulations, it must invest all of its investment 
assets abroad. In its annual report on AP buffer funds published in May 2014, the Swedish 
government observed a domestic weighting that is higher than the global reference index 
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MSCI World of equity investments, although the domestic equity weight of the fund’s 
investment allocations was only 14 per cent in 201394. 
According to the Swedish government, the situation is not optimal when it comes to the 
diversification of risks. On the other hand, the larger domestic share has been favoured as 
the average annual return (8%) from the Swedish equity markets has been clearly better than 
the reference index (1.6%) in the period 2001–2013. 
Of the other selected actors included in our survey, the Swedish earnings-related pension 
managers Alecta and AMF have made extensive domestic investments amounting to as 
much as 60 per cent of their total investment assets. The British BT and USS pension funds 
have invested nearly 50 per cent of their investment assets domestically. The share was 
slightly higher than that of the Finnish private-sector pension insurers (ca 30–40%). The 
Danish Industriens Pension and the Finnish public-sector pension providers fall in the mid-
range of the reviewed actors with their domestic investments amounting to 20–30 per cent 
of their investment assets. The domestic investments of the Dutch actors were the lowest, at 
10–20 per cent.
It is also noteworthy that, per se, foreign investments are affected by the size of the 
assets in comparison to the country’s GDP. The assets of the GPFG have grown to more than 
170 per cent of GDP, and the assets in the pension funds in the Netherlands amount to more 
than 150 per cent of GDP. Investing these assets domestically would be notably challenging 
and probably risky and, economically, even harmful.
In Finland, the share of domestic investments of earnings-related pension providers can 
be seen as fairly high in relation to the size of the economy. The domestic investments total 
about one third of the invested assets. However, the share is smaller than in the OECD’s 
(2013) sample of large private pension funds and buffer funds of different countries, in 
which the average fund invested 39.5 per cent of its assets abroad in 2012.
4.4 Review of the investment return of selected actors
A review of the returns of the groups of Finnish pension providers and of individual large 
foreign pension providers included in the survey shows that the average pension asset returns 
of Finnish groups of actors are on an average level or below the average of the compared 
group during the review periods. The average, annual real returns varied from 4.8 per cent 
of the British BT to 10.2 per cent of the Norwegian GPFG in 2009–2013. The equivalent 
of the Finnish public-sector pension providers was 7.3 per cent and of the private-sector 
pension providers 5.6 per cent. Within the group of public-sector pension providers, the 
equivalent return of different actors ranged between 4.3 and 7.9 per cent. The return of the 
largest private-sector pension providers ranged between 3.3 and 6.0 per cent. In 2009–2012, 
the average annual real return of private-sector pension assets in the OECD countries was 3.1 
per cent. The actors and groups of actors under review in this survey are among the most 
94 Redovisning av AP-fondernas verksamhet t.o.m. 2013. Skr. 2013/14:130. http://www.regeringen.se/sb/ 
d/18210/a/241150; IPE, Investment & Pensions Europe. 29.5.2014. Swedish government calls on AP funds to justify 
domestic investment bias http://www.ipe.com/10001954.article
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successful of the pension investors: the average annual real returns are 1.7–7.1 percentage 
points higher than the average return of pension investments in the OECD countries.
The results of a ten-year period (2004–2013) are parallel to those of a five-year period. 
The average annual real return between 2004 and 2013 varied from the Finnish private-
sector pension providers’ 3.4 per cent (return fluctuation of largest actors 2.0–3.8 per cent) 
to the Danish ATP’s 8.0 per cent. The Finnish public-sector pension providers reached an 
average 4.3 percent real return (the actors’ return varied between 3.8 and 7.4 per cent). In 
2003–2012, the OECD average annual real return was 2.3 per cent. The reviewed actors and 
groups of actors exceeded this return by 1.1–5.7 percentage points. 
CEM reached the same result of the Finnish pension system in an international 
investment review in which the five-year net return of the Finnish pension assets in 2007–
2011 was 2.5 per cent, while the median of net returns of global, larger funds for the same 
period was 3.5 per cent. A reason presented for the weaker result than the international, 
bigger actors in the period in question was the heavy weighting of Finnish pension assets 
in domestic investments. Finland fell behind the others in terms of returns especially in 
2010 and 2011, when the domestic equity weighting was 17 per cent and the Finnish equity 
markets were outperformed by other equity markets (Ambacthscheer 2013, 35, 40.)
The Reserve Fund Monitor 201195 survey by the International Social Security Association 
(ISSA) reviewed social insurance funds and other pension institutions. The survey included 
22 different participants, actors and groups of actors, of which three were Finnish statutory 
pension provider groups (pension insurance companies, company pension funds, industry-
wide pension funds and public-sector pension providers). The review focused on, among 
other things, the development of returns in 2009–2011 through nominal annual net returns. 
In that period, the return of all Finnish pension provider groups were clearly better than the 
average return of the reviewed pension providers.
Different sources, reviews and surveys (OECD, CEM, ISSA and the survey at hand) 
present different views on the comparison of the international return of pension investors. 
When comparing returns and when the reviewed group is limited to the major international 
pension investors, as in CEM’s survey, or when the reviewed group is limited even further 
into a few major Nordic and Western European pension investors, as in the survey at hand, 
the Finnish earnings-related pension insurers fall behind the leading ones. When looking 
at returns more broadly, such as in ISSA’s and OECD’s surveys, and by adding the number 
of reviewed actors so that also other actors than the major ones in Northern Europe or its 
immediate vicinity are included, the return of Finnish earnings-related pension insurers is 
clearly above average.
Finally, in addition to these international reviews, we need to compare the realised 
return of Finnish earnings-related pension insurers with an important domestic parameter: 
the expected 3.5 per cent real-return of the baseline projection of the Finnish Centre for 
Pensions. This assumed real return is used when estimating the long-term development of 
the earnings-related pension contribution and the financing of the earnings-related pension 
system. The return has developed more strongly in the last 17 years (1997–2013) than 
95 ISSA’s Reserve Fund Monitor surveys are available for ISSA members only. http://www.issa.int/resources/reserve-
fund-monitor/reports
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the currently used estimate in the projections: the average annual real return of the entire 
earnings-related pension field has been 4.0 per cent. The equivalent return rate for private-
sector pension providers has been 3.9 per cent and that for public-sector pension providers 
4.3 per cent.
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The Finnish Centre for Pensions is a statutory cooperation 
body for the development and implementation 
of earnings-related pension provision and an expert on 
pension insurance. For the evaluation, development and 
monitoring of pension provision, the Centre produces 
background surveys on pension provision and its funding.
Eläketurvakeskus (ETK) on työeläketurvan kehittämisen 
ja toimeenpanon lakisääteinen yhteistyöelin ja työeläkkeisiin 
erikoistunut tietotalo. Eläketurvan arviointia, kehittämistä 
ja seurantaa varten se tuottaa taustaselvityksiä eläketurvasta 
ja sen rahoituksesta.
 
Pensionsskyddscentralen (PSC) är ett lagstadgat samorgan
och sakkunnig inom verkställigheten och utvecklingen 
av arbetspensionsskyddet samt informationen om det. 
Pensionsskyddscentralen producerar bakgrundsinformation 
om pensionsskyddet och pensionsfinansieringen för 
bedömningen, utvecklingen och uppföljningen av 
arbetspensionsskyddet.
 
